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Comparing Security Risk-oriented Modelling Languages to Manage So-
cial Engineering Risks 
 
Abstract: 
Social engineering security risk management is emerging as a central technique for dealing 
with identification of occurring risks on the daily basis. Unfortunately, its standards might 
have limitations in support with security modelling languages and comprehension of users. 
This is a problem because lack of understanding can cause misinterpretation of analysis. 
Nowadays, same security events occur periodically, but they are not treated properly. It 
might be because ordinary users do not see vulnerabilities or their misunderstanding of on-
going process of risk treatment. Without knowing what is clear to ordinary users and what 
should be improved any social engineering analysis is irrelevant.  
The paper applies structured approach in identification of one security risk management 
standard that can be applied with different modelling languages. For a more in-depth anal-
ysis in this paper considered several modelling languages as BPMN, Secure Tropos and 
Misuse case. Taking into account the main aspect of the study in social engineering is psy-
chological manipulation of people, author considered as a good foundation of the illustration 
a book of Kevin Mitnick “The art of deception”. One case has been chosen for a further 
study and analysed using ISSRM domain model with application of aforementioned three 
security modelling languages.  
To identify certain concepts or logic of ordinary users and taking into account their lack of 
knowledge in information technology  this paper has been concentrated on weaknesses of 
modelling approaches for social engineering analysis. This led to the result that overall 
BPMN constructs and Secure Tropos concepts are preferred by users. Also based on col-
lected results, we tried to make a parallel between understanding of concepts and constructs 
for participants. Percentage wise understanding of constructs showed higher results than 
concepts. Business asset, IS asset, threat, attack method, risk treatment, security requirement 
and control are easily identified in the form of constructs. Concepts are have received higher 
score in following aspects: Business Asset, Security criterion, Impact, Event, Vulnerability, 
Threat, Threat agent, Security requirement. 
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Turvariskidele Orienteeritud Modelleerimiskeelte Võrdlus 
Manipuleerimisrünnete Riskijuhtimiseks 
 
Lühikokkuvõte: 
Manipuleerimisrünnete turvariskide juhtimine on muutumas igapäevase riskide 
identifitseerimise keskseks tehnikaks. Kahjuks võivad selle standardid turva-
modelleerimiskeelte ja kasutajate hõlmamise toetamisel olla piiratud. See on probleem, 
kuna vähene mõistmine võib viia analüüsi väärtõlgenduseni. Tänapäeval toimuvad 
korrapäraselt ühed ja samad turvasündmused, kuid neid ei käsitleta kohaselt. See võib 
tuleneda sellest, et tavakasutajad ei märka nõrkusi või tõlgendavad käimasolevat 
riskijuhtimisprotsessi vääralt. Teadmata, mis on tavakasutajale selge ja mida tuleks 
parandada, ei ole ükski manipuleerimisrünnete analüüs asjakohane. 
Selles töös rakendatakse struktureeritud lähenemist ühe turvariskide juhtimise standardi 
identifitseerimisele, mida saab rakendada eri modelleerimiskeeltega. Sügavamaks 
analüüsiks on selles töös kasutatud eri modelleerimiskeeli, nagu äriprotsesside 
modelleerimiskeel (ingl BPMN), Secure Tropos ja Misuse Case. Võttes arvesse, et 
manipuleerimisrünnete uurimise põhiaspekt on inimeste psühhomanipulatsioon, pidas autor 
heaks töö illustreerimise alusmaterjaliks Kevin Mitnicki raamatut „The art of deception”. 
Üks juhtum on valitud lähemaks uurimiseks ja analüüsitud, kasutades infosüsteemi 
turvariskide haldamise (ingl ISSRM) domeenimudelit eelpool mainitud kolme turva-
modelleerimiskeele rakendusega. 
Identifitseerimaks tavakasutajate konkreetseid kontseptsioone või loogikat ja võtmaks 
arvesse nende infotehnoloogiateadmiste vähesust, on see töö keskendatud 
modelleerimislähenemise nõrkadele külgedele manipuleerimisrünnete analüüsis. See viis 
tulemuseni, et kasutajad eelistavad üldisi BPMN-i konstruktsioone ja Secure Tropose 
kontseptsiooni. Samuti, tuginedes kogutud tulemustele, püüdsime tõmmata paralleeli 
kontseptsioonide mõistmise ja osalejate konstruktsioonide vahel. Protsentuaalselt olid 
konstruktsioonide mõistmise tulemused kontseptsioonide mõistmise tulemustest kõrgemad. 
Ärivara, IS-vara, oht, ründmeetod, riskihaldus, turvanõue ja kontroll on konstruktsioonide 
vormis kergesti identifitseeritavad. Kontseptsioonide skoor oli kõrgem järgnevais 
aspektides: ärivara, turvakriteerium, mõju, sündmus, nõrkus, oht, ohuagent, turvanõue. 
 
Võtmesõnad: 
Manipuleerimisrünne, turvariskide juhtimine, ISSRM, CORAS, OCTAVE, ISO 17799, 
COBRA, BPMN, Secure Tropos, Misuse Cases, infosüsteem 
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1 Introduction 
The rapid development of information technology affected to the security of information 
systems. Traditional role of IS security specialist included technical competences, but in this 
latter days there is a need to have a mix of IT and business profile. One should also 
acknowledge the social engineering threats towards organization although it might not help 
in clarification of social engineering processes. As social engineering plays a vital role there 
is a need to construct such a modelling approach that will be suitable for ordinary users to 
comprehend those changes. 
The study is centred on Social Engineering Security and Risk Management languages. 
Scope is summarized in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1. Scope of the work 
The thesis is not concentrated only on security risk management aspects, but also takes care 
of social engineering aspects and existing modelling languages. Contribution aims to under-
stand what existing modelling languages that support security risk management approach 
could be considered as the most understandable language for ordinary users to model Social 
Engineering risks. 
In the thesis were overviewed security risk management standards as ISO 17799,NIST 700-
30 and security risk management methods like COBRA (A. Jones, 2005), CORAS (Heidi, 
2007), OCTAVE (Alberts and Dorofee, 2001) and ISSRM (Mayer, 2009). Considering the 
main subject area of the paper, basic introduction to social engineering was also given. As 
12 
 
the main aspect of the study in social engineering is psychological manipulation of people, 
author considered as a good foundation of the illustration a book of Kevin Mitnick “The art 
of deception” (D. Mitnick, 2002). Social Engineering cases were presented using three mod-
elling languages: BPMN (Altuhhova, 2013), Secure Tropos (Matulevičius et al., 2008b), 
Misuse case (Soomro, 2012).  
More specifically, the research question is what modelling approach is most suitable for 
social engineering analysis?  To provide necessary analyses, there is a need to investigate 
existing languages and compare them with concept needs. In order to identify the under-
standing of participants to each considered modelling language, we have prepared a ques-
tionnaire. This helped to collect data with obtained results.  
All above mentioned research process has led us to the result that overall BPMN constructs 
and Secure Tropos concepts are preferred by users. Also based on collected results, we tried 
to make a parallel between understanding of concepts and constructs for participants. Per-
centage wise understanding of constructs showed higher results than concepts. Business as-
set, IS asset, threat, attack method, risk treatment, security requirement and control are easily 
identified in the form of constructs. Concepts are have received higher score in following 
aspects: Business Asset, Security criterion, Impact, Event, Vulnerability, Threat, Threat 
agent, Security requirement. 
Thus this thesis is organised in six chapter. Chapter 2 provides outline of existing security 
risk management standards and method, such as ISSRM domain model which has been 
studied in more details. Chapter 3 presents an overview of different type’s methods of social 
engineering attack and their alignment of ISSRM domain model. Chapter 4 introduces 
several modelling languages: BPMN, Misuse case, Secure Tropos and alignment of each 
language to ISSRM domain model with application to a studied case. Chapter 5 is about 
provided research and results of collected data. Chapter 6 summaries the major findings and 
deliberated future work.   
The document ends with the list of references that were used. Finally Appendix section 
presents some research material that were excluded from the main thesis. It starts with Social 
Engineering Cases that collects all identified cases from the book of Kevin Mitnick “The art 
of deception”. To each of the case constructed table, which represents alignment of ISSRM 
domain model. Next section Social Engineering Examples in BPMN which has rest of cases 
that were divided based on Granger’s division of social engineering attacks and applied 
BPMN modelling language. After that Social Engineering Examples in Misuse Case and 
Social Engineering Examples in Secure Tropos. Moreover Questionnaire of BPMN, Ques-
tionnaire of Misuse Case and Questionnaire of Secure Tropos were included to the appendix 
list. Lastly, all collected data upon BPMN, Misuse case and Secure Tropos concepts & con-
structs were presented in last three sections.  
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2 Approaches for Security Risk Management 
History has proven that stability, no matter how perfect it may be leading to degradation. 
Development is not possible without a risk. The same notion is applies to information tech-
nology. Its rapid development has affected the formation of security management methods 
and standards.   
This chapter covers main security risk management risk management standards such as ISO 
17799 (ISO/IEC 17799:2000), NIST 800-30 (G. Stoneburner, 2004) and security risk man-
agement methods like COBRA (A. Jones, 2005), CORAS (Heidi, 2007), OCTAVE (Alberts 
and Dorofee, 2003) and ISSRM (Mayer, 2009). During the studying process, we is explain-
ing only selected ISSRM domain model is selected. 
Section 2.1 which provides an overview of security risk management. Overview of different 
security risk management standards is presented in Section 2.2. Section 2.3 overview of 
security risk management methodologies like CORAS (Heidi, 2007), OCTAVE (Alberts 
and Dorofee, 2003), and ISSRM (Mayer, 2009). This chapter ends with Section 2.4 which 
outlines research study and makes a comparison of security risk management standards and 
methodologies. 
2.1 Security Risk Management 
Security risk management (SRM) is an extended process of analyzing and listing Infor-
mation System’s (IS) security risks and employing controls (i.e., countermeasures, safe-
guards) that address those risks (e.g., Albert and Dorofee 2003, ISO/IEC 2000; ITGI 2005; 
NIST 2004). It is getting increasingly important to every organization that has aimed to 
effectively manage information security issues. Customers in every business organization 
realizes the importance of confidentiality of their personal and business data. Investors from 
their side need to be confident, that the business and information assets are protected. Busi-
ness partners expect that the company will operate without any failure which can be caused 
by error in information system, intentional or unintentional actions of staff, malicious soft-
ware and other factors (Wozniak, 2004).   
To avoid those uncertainties in organizational environment, some steps have to process for 
security risk management (Jenkins, 1998):  recognition of assets; value position to each as-
set; identification of vulnerability to each asset; calculation of risk for identifying asset;  mit-
igation of identifying risks and selection of remedy. Various approaches, techniques, meth-
ods and standards exist to manage risks. Besides several approaches, there are also standards 
that describe the risk management process and serve as quite for them.  
2.2 Different Risk Management Standards 
There is a number of information risk management standards as ISO 15408 (J. Wiley, 2006), 
ISO 17799 (M. Kaufman, 2009), and BSI (BSI Standard, 2005); as well as national stand-
ards NIST 80030 (G. Stoneburner, 2004), SAC (Z.Qian, 2012), COSO (J. Wiley, 2006), 
SAS 55/78 (M. Kaufman, 2009) and some other similar to them. These information risk 
management techniques involve following steps (Moffett, 2003):   
 define the main goals and objectives to the protection of information assets;   
 support the creation of an effective system of assessment and information risk man-
agement;   
 help with the calculation of a set of detailed not only qualitative but also quantitative 
risk assessments, adequate stated business objectives;   
14 
 
 use special tools for assessments and risk management.   
In this paper different standards focuses on various aspects. For example, ISO (ISO27001, 
2005) is the International Organization for Standardization that develops and publishes in-
ternational standards. In ISO/IEC 17799 Information Technology - Security Techniques - 
Code of Practice for Information Security Management (ISO 17799) combines best prac-
tices and brings together information security, intellectual property rights, protection and 
audit controls.   
Another example is NIST 800-30 (Mayer, 2009) The National Institute of Standards and 
Technology developed the standard NIST SP 800-30. It includes recommended guidelines 
for securing IT infrastructure from a technical perspective. NIST SP 800-30 is a well-ac-
cepted standard for risk assessment.  
2.3 Security Risk Management Methodologies 
Security Risk Management includes different strategies, policies, activities, roles, proce-
dures and people that manage those risks. The aim is to have a system of controls that col-
lectively guarantee protect IS security. As an example will be mentioned three methods: 
CORAS (Heidi, 2007), OCTAVE (Hogganvik, 2007), ISSRM (Mayer, 2009):   
 Their history and background will look into these models following;   
 Main steps for risk management approach;   
 Purpose of the approach.  
2.3.1 CORAS 
CORAS method is a traditional security analysis technique combined with the system de-
velopment approach such as the UML. From 1999-2003 method was developed in the EU 
funded CORAS project (Heidi, 2007). The aim of the project was to gather risk analysis 
techniques into an integrated security risk analysis method. It was called CORAS security 
analysis. The intent of it was to apply several risk analysis techniques in a mixed and easier 
manner.    
The CORAS modelling technique has three main purposes (Stolen, 2003):   
i. to describe the target of assessment;    
ii. to support communication and integration between different groups of stake-
holders involved in risk assessment;   
iii. To document risk assessment results and the assumption on which results de-
pend.   
CORAS method takes into account several international standards for risk management like 
Australian/New Zealand Standard for Risk Management (K. Roebuck, 2012), the ISO/IEC 
13335 (J. Kouns, 2011) Guidelines for the management (J. Kouns, 2011) of IT-Security and 
the system documentation in the form of the Reference model for open distributed pro-
cessing.    
CORAS is structured in five stages: (1) context establishment, (2) risk identification, (3) 
risk estimation, (4) risk evaluation and (5) treatment identification (Braber et al., 2007).   
To sum up this method over others, below outlined several advantages (Folker et al., 2007):   
 It has a precise description of the target system and presents all relevant security 
features in accessible format;   
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 It uses the graphical representation which improves communication and interaction 
between parties involved in the analysis;   
 It facilitates documentation of risk assessment results and the assumptions on which 
these results depend.  
2.3.2 OCTAVE 
Operationally Critical Threat, Asset, and Vulnerability Evaluation (OCTAVE) technique 
appeared in the USA in the Software Engineering Institute of the Carnegie Mellon Univer-
sity. It has been published in 2001. Despite old version of other methods, it remains actual 
and relevant.  The main interesting part of OCTAVE is a brainstorming method to investi-
gate risks.   
OCTAVE is used to assess an organization’s information security needs. This is based on 
three phased approach. It helps to examine organizational and technological issues with a 
wider picture of the current situation in organization’s information security needs (Hog-
ganvik, 2007).   
The main steps of this approach are presented in Figure 2. The aim of this method firstly is 
to study organizational and technological issues. Secondly it defines security strategy of an 
organization. The major steps are:   
1. identifying critical assets and threats to them;   
2. identifying the vulnerabilities, both organizational and technological, that expose 
those threats, creating risk to the organization;   
3. Developing a practice-based protection strategy and risk mitigation plan to support 
the organization’s missing and priorities.  
 
 
Figure 2. The OCTAVE Process (Hogganvik, 2007) 
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2.3.3 Domain Model of ISSRM 
Information System Security Risk Management (ISSRM) method is a family of previous 
mentioned CORAS method (Mayer, 2009). The aim of this approach is to ensure the pro-
tection of an IS by defining security requirement and implementing the appropriate risk 
management solution. ISSRM’s aim is to maximize the security level that an organization 
wants to achieve (AS/NZS 4360, 2004).    
The process is followed by classical and common steps as (Stoneburner, 2002): context and 
asset identification, determination of security objectives, risk analysis and assessment, risk 
treatment, the security requirements definition, control selection and implementation. 
ISSRM process can be summarized in one activity form of a UML diagram.    
This process model should be regularly performed by organization to keep business com-
petitive and ensure security level. The ISSRM domain model illustrated in Fig. 2 considerers 
three groups of concepts: (1) asset-related concepts, (2) risk-related concepts and (3) risk-
treatment related concepts.   
Asset-related concepts are used to describe assets of the organization that needs to be se-
cured. Asset has an aim to support organization on a daily processes and distinguish security 
criteria. Business asset is valued information or process that assists in achievement of ob-
jectives that organization has. IS asset is a part of supported business asset in IS. Security 
criterion includes confidentiality integrity and availability of business asset (Matulevičius 
et al, 2008).   
Risk related concepts represent risks itself and their components: Risk is a combination of a 
threat with one or several vulnerabilities that lead to negative impart to assets. Impact is the 
direct effect of risks when the threat (or an event) is accomplished, that may harm assets of 
the system or an organization. The Event is the combination of a threat and vulnerabilities. 
Vulnerability is a characteristic or group of IS assets that establish weakness or flat of IS 
security. Threat agent is an agent, who might cause a harm to the assets of the IS. Attack 
method is a method used by a threat agent who performs a threat (Matulevičius et al., 2008).  
 
Figure 3. ISSRM Domain Model (Mayer, 2009) 
Risk treatment — rafted concepts characterises what decisions, requirements and controls 
should be implemented to mitigate possible risks. In order to achieve this concepts aim, need 
to pursue following steps: Risk treatment is the decision of dealing for potential risks, like: 
avoiding, reducing, transferring and retaining. Security requirement  is a step of 
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countermeasures that are identified to mitigate potential risks. Control countermeasures to 
improve security which are specified by security requirements (Matulevičius et al, 2008).  
2.4 Summary 
There are various approaches and standards related to security risk management. To identify 
the most suitable security risk management method that aligns with different modelling ap-
proaches for a further analysis, author made a Table 1. It represents different standards and 
methods which were reviewed before. Based on mentioned steps to processed security risk 
management, author decided to review mentioned standards and methods from perception 
of these different steps.    
Table 1 shows that each method has its own strengths and weaknesses. For example CORAS 
risk management method can combine different methods of analysis, but this could be 
counted as a shortcoming because it is a time consuming and the process of application of 
inexperienced user is problematic. Taking into account that OCTAVE and CORAS ap-
proaches are quite similar, both of them will not be considered as a most suitable modelling 
approaches for a further study. If analyze ISO 17799, there is a lack of measurement preci-
sion of a technical standard and it is not as entire as other methods. NIST 800-30 has an 
inaccurate results in case of calculation of risk occurrence, which at the end might lead to 
totally diverse results. In this case ISSRM can be applied with different modelling ap-
proaches, but at the same time it has an unfavorable aspect as it might be difficult to deter-
mine a suitable approach.   
All mentioned standards and methods deliver security orientation and risk-based ap-
proach.  However, if we take a look to the application of methods to model-based approaches 
only CORAS and ISSRM provide some level of granularity. CORAS has a disconnection 
for standard terminology, therefore ISSRM domain model has been chosen for further ap-
plication. ISSRM domain model will be applied to identify assets and risks, select security 
requirements and mitigation of risks to provided cases. The main advantage of ISSRM do-
main model is its alignment with Misuse cases (Soomro, 2012), Secure Tropos (Mat-
ulevičius et al., 2008b) and BPMN (Altuhhova, 2013).  
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Table 1. Comparison of modelling approaches 
Risk Manage-
ment Ap-
proach/Method 
ISO 17799 NIST 800-30 CORAS OCTAVE ISSRM 
Identification 
of assets 
Asset man-
agement 
Characteristics 
of the system 
Refining 
the target 
descrip-
tion using 
asset dia-
grams 
Identifying 
operational 
area man-
agement 
knowledge 
Content 
and asset 
identifica-
tion 
Value assign-
ment to each 
asset 
Access con-
trol, commu-
nications and 
operations 
manage-
ment, physi-
cal and envi-
ronmental 
security 
Definition of 
probability ex-
ploits 
Approval 
of target 
descrip-
tion 
Identifying 
stuff 
knowledge 
Determina-
tion of se-
curity ob-
jectives 
Identification 
of vulnerability 
to each asset 
Physical and 
environmen-
tal security, 
human re-
sources se-
curity 
Identification 
of threats, vul-
nerabilities 
Risk iden-
tification 
using 
threat dia-
grams 
Create 
thread pro-
file 
Risk Anal-
ysis and as-
sessment 
Calculation of 
risk for identi-
fied asset 
Information 
systems ac-
quisition, de-
velopment 
and mainte-
nance 
Identification 
of risks 
Risk eval-
uation us-
ing risk di-
agrams 
Conduct 
risk analy-
sis 
Risk Anal-
ysis and as-
sessment 
Mitigation of 
identified risks 
and selection 
Information 
security inci-
dent man-
agement, 
business 
continuity 
management 
Recommenda-
tions on 
measures of 
protection 
Risk treat-
ment dia-
grams 
Develop-
ment pro-
tection 
strategy 
and mitiga-
tion plan 
Risk treat-
ment, secu-
rity re-
quirements 
definition 
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3 Social Engineering 
3.1 Role of Social Engineering 
Today, the human factor in information security plays an important role (Thompson, 2006). 
Many companies who think that the problem of information security can be solved simply 
by using hardware and software, are mistaken. Security controls such as firewalls, device 
identification, encryption, Intrusion Detection System are ineffective in countering hackers 
using social engineering techniques. Evidently, there is a need of a strong staff development, 
its training and the use of security policies in confrontation techniques against social engi-
neers. Thereby an integration of all mentioned above methods is a need to guarantee the 
system’s security (Ibrahiem, 2013).   
One of the hackers techniques, which uses weak spots based on the human nature called 
social engineering (Adam, 1996). This technique helps hackers to get information that is 
necessary to break through the secured system. The goal of social engineering is to trick the 
victim in order to obtain certain information or to force to act in a certain way (Rahul, 
2013).    
In order to obtain information, there are many methods that could be used. Some of the 
attack types are as follows (Granger, 2001):   
 Via telephone. The attacker might put himself in the position of a victim and ask for 
an assistance or help. As people tend to pity those who are facing difficulty, the 
success of the attack is rather high. This method helps to obtain information directly 
from people, who are inside of the organization.   
 Search in the recycle bin. This includes neglecting vital documents and placing them 
in the trash bin.   
 Through internet. Using this method attacker searches password, as people tend to 
reuse the single password when entering to different systems. If an attacker gets one 
password, then it is easier to get to different accounts belonging to the same person. 
An attacker might send an email to the victim to assure the identity and search for 
all important information, which person will provide by updating it.   
 Through persuasion. This technique is concentrated on the psychological side. The 
aim is to prepare an ideal psychological situation to get targeted information.   
 Breaking through a computer network. Attacker breakthrough computer network in 
order to gain a trust from the user and force him to provide information of the or-
ganization.   
The most vulnerable to social engineering attack are new employees. As a rule, they have 
not been able to talk about all the existing corporate rules, they did not examine the infor-
mation security regulations (Christopher, 2011). Beginners do not yet know all their col-
leagues, especially in person. In addition, they are characterized by increased trust and will-
ingness to help, in order to establish themselves as an active and responsive team member, 
on which organization could rely. They are unlikely to be interested in the rights of access 
of a social engineer who is impersonating another member, especially a superior (Rajendra, 
2013).    
Even the most vigilant employees are not always able to recognize the social engineering 
attack. Naturally, man should not act as a lie detector. A key success factor to the company 
is appropriate training. Security policies must enter into the flesh and blood of everyone 
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who works in the company. Employees need to know, that they might be attacked if their 
customer (Wozniak, 2004):   
i. increased interest to them, 
ii. exaggerated care and attention 
iii. refuses to give his coordinates 
iv. appeals with a strange or unusual request , 
v. trying to insinuate  in confidence, or flatters 
vi. speaks to emphasize the authoritative tone.   
Certainly every organization has to develop those policies, before it crams employees with 
these policies. There are common defenses that might take a place (Mitnick K., 2002):  show 
identity when try to enter to the building; password over the phone; use of technology ID; 
passwords are not left lying around.   
To protect its organization from social engineering attacks employer has to understand the 
need to provide training programs for all categories of workers. All preventive measures 
and actions have to be taken in order to prevent exposure of vital information (Christopher, 
2011). There should be policies and procedures to cover necessary security regulations: reg-
ulating helpdesk procedures, access privileges, others. These methods help to employees to 
be aware of social engineering attack. Through seminars workers can be aware on how to 
be more careful on what type of information they are providing and what they are throwing 
to trash. They will understand the value of information and immediately report to security 
personnel in case of any strange case. 
3.2 Examples of Social Engineering Attacks 
This section describes some cases that were taken from the book of Kevin D. Mitnick “The 
Art of deception”. Each case has been carved based on Granger’s division of social engi-
neering attacks. We examine each case following the ISSRM principles.   
The research method is done using the concept alignment of ISSRM domain model. It was 
represented in Figure 3. For each event shown in that table exist mutual events. To make 
those concepts presented in a table form shorted, some of those events are skipped. For 
example: threat agent and attack method together produce a threat. It is missing in the table 
as a threat agent and attack method are identified. Also threat and vulnerability represent an 
event that occurred in specific cases. Based on that term event is also not shows in the table. 
The same concept is used to asset. It is a representation of IS asset and Business asset. The 
reader should note that when analyzing and studying presented tables.  
3.2.1 Example of Social Engineering Attack Via Telephone 
Content identification: Jenny Acton is an employee, who worked in «Hometown Electric 
Power» more than three years at the service of customers. Once she received a call. The 
caller said, that he has damaged his computer by virus. In consequence of this he cannot get 
information to one of the vice-presidents. Caller asked to see from the system (CBIS) ac-
count number, phone number entry and service address. Then said goodbye and hung up.    
Risk analysis. As presented in Table 2 in this context we identify the business asset as all 
the information requested by the caller. The risk is defined as follows: The caller, who 
knows CBIS and structure of organization and how to use the phone. 
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Risk-treatment concept: in order to mitigate and avoid potential risks Jenny needed verify 
that caller is an employee. She has to realize that some of the information might be publicly 
accessible and some information of her department is sensitive. From the organization’s 
perspective it might be good to regularly organize security trainings to their employees (such 
as Jenny).   
Table 2. Example of managing Via phone securityrisk 
Business asset Account number on CBIS, information on CBIS about is the account 
number current, service address, phone number. 
IS asset Customer Billing Information System, Jenny. 
Security crite-
rion 
Confidentiality of information on CBIS about is the account number 
current,confidentiality of account number on CBIS, confidentiality of 
information on CBIS. 
Impact Negation of authentication of the caller, Jenny is not trusted. 
Vulnerability Jenny is not experienced to verify the caller. 
Threat agent Caller (attacker): knows how to use phone, knows CBIS, structure of 
organization. 
Attack method The caller said that he has damaged his computer by virus. In 
consequence of this he cannot get information to one of the vice-
presidents. Caller collected data thorough search to confirm his 
authenticity. Caller asked to see from the system account number, phone 
number entry and service address. 
 
3.2.2 Example of Social Engineering Attack Through Search in Recycle Bin 
Content identification: The guy named Steve, called to a small central office telephone 
company building, which runs telephone lines to all homes and businesses in the service 
area. On duty switchman answered to the call. Steve said that he is from divisions of the 
company that publishes and distributes printed materials. He has a new version of Test Num-
bered Directory, but for security reasons we cannot give a copy to the switchman until he 
got old one. It seems reasonable to unsuspecting switchman. He did as he was asked, placed 
on the verge of building.  Steve arrived and carefully looked around in search of the police 
or security staff of the company, which could hide behind trees, or wait for him in a parked 
car. There was no one on sight. He casually took directory and left.   
Risk analysis. As presented in Table 3 in this context we identify the business asset as all 
information that is stored in Test Numbered Directory. The risk is identified as follows: 
Steve knows how to use the phone, also knows about Test Numbered Directory and who 
has the original Test Numbered Directory. 
Risk-treatment concept: in order to mitigate and avoid potential risks Switchman needed 
to verify from his colleagues that there has been issued a new version of Test Numbered 
Directory and to ask from security specialist is there mentioned something about exchange 
of published and printed out materials copies in security policy. From the organisation’s 
perspective it might be good to regularly organize security trainings to their employees. 
3.2.3 Example of Social Engineering Attack Through Internet 
Following one is through Internet which is also identified in the case of Graduating without 
Honors.    
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Table 3. Example of managing Stevie’s scam security risk 
Business asset Test Numbered Directory 
IS asset Switchman on duty 
Security criterion Confidentiality of the information on Test Numbered Directory 
Impact Negation of authentication of a caller, switchman is not trusted 
Vulnerability Switchman is not experienced to verify the caller 
Threat agent Steve knows how to use the phone, knows who has the original Test 
Numbered Directory, knows about Test Numbered Directory 
Attack method Steve called to the small central office telephone company building 
and said that for security reasons he cannot give employees copy until 
he gets old one. 
 
Content identification: Michael Parker decided to see if he could "create" his own accel-
erated bachelor's degree in computer science by searching for a graduate with the same name 
as his, who had earned a computer science degree any time during an appropriate span of 
years. If so, he could just put down the other Michael Parker's social security number on 
employment application forms; any company that checked the name and social security 
number with the university would be told that, yes, he did have the claimed degree. To 
achieve his goal first of all he went to the main library on the university campus, he sat down 
at a computer terminal, got up on the Internet, and accessed the university's Web site. Then 
he called the Registrar's office. The answer, admin.rnu.edu, gave him the name of the com-
puter where student records were stored. This was the first piece of the puzzle: He now knew 
his target machine. He typed that URL into the computer and got no response--as expected, 
there was a firewall blocking access. So he ran a program to see if he could connect to any 
of the services running on that computer, and found an open port with a Telnet service run-
ning, which allows one computer to connect remotely to another computer and access it as 
if directly connected using a dumb terminal. All he would need to gain access would be the 
standard user ID and password. He made another call to the registrar's office, this time lis-
tening carefully to make sure he was talking to a different person. He got a lady, and again 
he claimed to be from the university's Computer Center. He told that they were installing a 
new production system for administrative records, he told her. As a favor, he'd like her to 
connect to the new system, which still is in test mode, to see if she could access student 
academic records. He gave her the IP address to connect to and talked her through the pro-
cess. In fact, the IP address took her to the computer Michael was sitting at in the campus 
library. He had created a login simulator--a decoy sign in screen--looking just like the one 
she was accustomed to seeing when going onto the system for student records. She told to 
attacker that on screen is error message: Login incorrect. By now, the login simulator had 
fed the keystrokes of her account name and password to Michael's terminal; mission accom-
plished. He told her that he will set up your account, and call her back. Now Michael knew 
what computer system he needed to access and he had a user's ID and password. First step 
in clearing this last hurdle: Find out who could guide him through the mysteries of searching 
the student database. He called the Registrar's office again, this time reaching a different 
person. Minutes later he was on the phone with the college's database administrator, pulling 
the sympathy act. By the time they hung up, Michael had downloaded the entire list of com-
puter science graduates for those years. Within a few minutes he had run a search, located 
two Michael Parkers, chosen one of them, and obtained the guy's social security number as 
well as other pertinent information stored in the database. He had just become "Michael 
Parker, B.S. in Computer Science, graduated with honors, 1998." In this case, the "B.S." 
was uniquely appropriate.  
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Table 4. Example of managing Graduating without Honor’s case security risk 
Business asset University record about students, student name, social security number, 
graduation grades 
IS asset Login, password, Registration office, database, library, administration 
office, firewall, telnet service, dump terminal 
Security crite-
rion 
Confidentiality of university records about students 
Impact Loss of username and password, loss of university record of a student 
Vulnerability Open telnet and the college's database administrator, pulling the 
sympathy act to Michael Parker 
Threat agent Michael Parker: has an access to the university campus library, has an 
access to the computer terminal, knows how to use phone, has a 
knowledge in networking, has a knowledge in creation  of log simulator. 
Attack method Going to the main library on the university campus, he sat down at a 
computer terminal, got up on the Internet, and accessed the university's 
Web site.   
Then he called the Registrar's office.    
The answer, admin.rnu.edu, gave him the name of the computer where 
student records were stored.    
He typed that URL into the computer and got no response--as ex-
pected, there was a firewall blocking access. So he ran a program to 
see if he could connect to any of the services running on that computer, 
and found an open port with a Telnet service running, which allows 
one computer to connect remotely to another computer and access it as 
if directly connected using a dumb terminal.    
He made another call to the registrar's office, this time listening care-
fully to make sure he was talking to a different person. He got a lady, 
and again he claimed to be from the university's Computer Center.    
He gave her the IP address to connect to, and talked her through the 
process. In fact, the IP address took her to the computer Michael was 
sitting at in the campus library. 
He had created a login simulator--a decoy sign-in screen--looking just 
like the one she was accustomed to seeing when going onto the system 
for student records. "It's not working," she told him. "It keeps saying 
'Login incorrect. By now the login simulator had fed the keystrokes of 
her account name and password to Michael's terminal; mission accom-
plished. He told her, "Oh, some of the accounts haven't been brought 
over yet to this machine. Let me set up your account, and I'll call you 
back”. 
Now Michael knew what computer system he needed to access, and he 
had a user's ID and password.    
He called the Registrar's office again, this time reaching a different 
person. Minutes later he was on the phone with the college's database 
administrator, pulling the sympathy act. By the time they hung up, Mi-
chael had downloaded the entire list of computer science graduates for 
those years. 
Risk analysis. As presented in Table 4 in this context we identify the business as university 
record about students; their name, social security number and graduation grades. The risk is 
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defined as follows: Michael Parker has an access to the university campus library, to the 
computer terminal and has a knowledge in networking with a creation of log simulator.  
Risk-treatment concept: in order to mitigate and avoid potential risks all employees who 
are able to access any sensitive information have to know the importance of sensitive 
information. Maintain a list of people who have been specially trained in the procedures and 
who are trusted to authorize sending out sensitive information. Require that only these 
people be allowed to send information to anyone outside the workgroup. From the corporate 
perspective, there is a fundamental need for good training. But there is also a need for 
something else: a variety of ways to remind people of what they've learned.   
3.2.4 Example of Social Engineering Attack Through Persuasion 
The case mentioned in the book “Art of Deception” and reflecting social engineering attack 
through persuasion is Steve Cramer’s Story.   
Content identification: Steve worked on the creation of new devices for GeminiMed Med-
ical Products which worked on a new product called STH-100. On Saturday morning called 
Ramon Perez from tech support. He reported that three of the servers are not working and 
that tech specialist has to reinstall the drivers and restore all of the files. Since it was com-
pletely unacceptable for Steve and he wanted as quickly as possible to finish its work and 
not wait a few days, he began to push the technical department of the person to do his com-
puter as soon as possible. For this, the caller started asking what server he uses, but the man 
from technical department said that he will also need a username and password. This issue 
has caused suspicion and he asked the chief of the name and surname of the person who 
called. The caller said that he could see what was written on the piece of filled paper in 
hiring time. He called the password "Janice". Thereby earning the trust of Steve said his ID 
and password. The caller asked for a couple of hours to restore the files. Steve graduated 
with a lawn, ate, and when he got to the computer, he found that his files were actually 
recovered.  
Risk analysis. As presented in Table 5 in this context we identify the business as all files 
that are stored in computer servers with an information of STH-100. The risk is defined as 
follows: Ramon Perez has a phone number of employee, knows the structure of organiza-
tion, has an access to old information of employee, knows how to use cell phone and how 
obtain trust of employee. 
Risk-treatment concept: in order to mitigate and avoid potential risks Steve needed to ver-
ify that person who called is from technical support. From the organization’s perspective it 
might be good to regularly organize security trainings to their employees.  
3.2.5 Example of Social Engineering Attack Breaking Through Computer Net-
work 
The last one is breaking through computer network which is considered in situation of the 
dictionary as an attack tool.  
Content identification: Ivan Peters had a target of retrieving the source code for a new 
electronic game. After finding an un-patched vulnerability in the Web server software, his 
buddy had just about fallen out of his chair when he realized the system had been set up as 
a dual-homed host, which meant he had an entry point into the internal network. Instead of 
using a technical approach to finding out what server he needed to target, Ivan used a social 
engineering approach. He placed phone calls based on methods similar to those described 
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elsewhere in this book. First, calling IT technical support, he claimed to be a company em-
ployee having an interface issue on a product his group was designing and asked for the 
phone number of the project leader for the gaming development team.. 
Table 5. Example of managing Steve Cramer’s story security risk 
Business asset All files, drivers, computer servers, STH-100 
IS asset Computer servers RM22 and GM16, username (ID), password 
Security crite-
rion 
Confidentiality of username(ID) and password 
Impact Steve is not trusted, negation of authentication process 
Event Steve received a call from Ramon Perez from tech support with an 
information that three of the servers are not working and they’ll need 
some time to reinstall the driver and restore all of their files.  To have an 
access to his information as soon as possible Steven asked from tech 
support to deal with it urgently. Ramon Perez was pleased to help, but 
in order to help he needed to ask some verification questions. 
Vulnerability Steve is not experienced to verity the caller 
Threat agent Ramon Perez from tech support who knows how to use cellphone, who 
has a phone number of employee, who knows the structure of 
organization, who received an access to old information of 
employee  and thanks to that gained a trust. 
Attack method Roman Perez did some research in advance to sound authentic 
Called to Steve and introduced himself as an employee from technical 
support, with a ready to help 
Then he called the name he'd been given, posing as a guy from IT. He just gave the name 
of the servers, ATM5 and ATM6. At this point, Ivan switched to a technical approach to get 
the authentication information. The first step with most technical attacks on systems that 
provide remote access capability is to identify an account with a weak password, which 
provides an initial entry point into the system. While this attack was running, Ivan started 
another computer running a similar attack on the other server used by the development 
group, ATM6. He still had not been able to get a password for an account on the ATM5 
machine. Using his hacker mindset, understanding the poor security habits of typical users, 
he figured one of the team members might have chosen the same password for both ma-
chines. In fact, that's exactly what he found. One of the team members was using the pass-
word "garners" on both ATM5 and ATM6. The door had swung wide open for Ivan to hunt 
around until he found the programs he was after.    
Risk analysis. As presented in Table 6 in this context we identify the business as the source 
code for a new electronic game and web server software. The risk is defined as follows: Ivan 
Peters: has a good knowledge in finding vulnerabilities in software, also on how to make a 
technical attack and find out a password and about basic structure of an organization. 
Risk-treatment concept: in order to mitigate and avoid potential risks employee shouldn’t 
speak valuable information of the organization and do no use easy passwords. Preventing 
this kind of attack typically involves taking steps on both human and technical levels. Or-
ganization has to deploy all possible countermeasures of protection. Security policies should 
discourage deviation from procedure through a system of rewards and consequences. Natu-
rally, the policies must be realistic, not calling on employees to carry out steps so burden-
some that they are likely to be ignored. 
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Table 6. Example of managing The dictionary as an attack tool security risk 
Business asset The source code for a new electronic game, web server software 
IS asset Internal network (set up as dual-home host), IT technical support, 
project leader 
Security criterion Confidentiality of source code for a new electronic game program 
Impact Ivan: employees negated authentication process, IT technical support 
and project leader are not trusted 
Vulnerability Same password was used in servers ATM5 and ATM6, unpatched 
vulnerability in the Web-Server software 
Threat agent Ivan Peters: has a good knowledge in finding vulnerabilities in soft-
ware, has a knowledge about basic structure of an organization, has 
a knowledge on how to make a technical attack and find out a pass-
word 
Attack method Noticed un-patched vulnerability in the Web-Server software   
Called to IT technical support, claims to be a company employee, 
asks phone number of project leader   
Called to project leader as a guy from IT and received name of serv-
ers 
Made a technical attacks on systems that provide remote access ca-
pability to identify weak password   
When he was not able to find a password to ATM5, he figured out 
that some member might have chosen the same password for both 
machines and did further research in that area. 
 
 
3.3 Summary 
In this Chapter, we have covered the role of social engineering and some examples of social 
engineering attacks with application to ISSRM domain model. First, we presented the role 
of social engineering. Second, an overview of some chosen cases with constructed ISSRM 
domain model.  Based on conducted study, we decided to select only one provided example. 
It will be included in a further research of this paper. The chosen case is “Via telephone”. 
Others are also applied to the research, but are moved to Appendix. We ended this chapter 
by conclusion with regard of a further research. 
In the next chapter, we start out introduction of ISSRM domain model’s alignment with 
Misuse case, BPMN and Secure Tropos. We introduce each modelling language and present 
its application to the chosen case. This applied concept presents an integration in an ISSRM 
modelling language.  
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4 Security Modelling Languages 
Indubitably information system (IS) plays an important role in security of sensitive contexts. 
Albeit subsisting security modelling languages provide some designates to model security 
aspects, they do not contain concrete constructs to address vulnerably susceptible system 
assets, their risks and risk treatments (Matulevičius et al., 2012). Furthermore, security lan-
guages do not provide a crosscutting viewpoint relating all three together. Security analyst 
faces difficulties in detection of potential security imperfections. This situation advocates to 
review existing security-oriented modelling languages and their usage with security risk 
management (Matulevičius et al., 2012). It is important to consider several modelling lan-
guages as Secure Tropos (Matulevičius et al., 2008b), BPMN (Altuhhova, 2013), Mal-ac-
tivities (G. Sindre, REFSQ 2007), Misuse case (Soomro, 2012).   
4.1 Overview of Security Modelling Languages 
The Secure Tropos (Mouratidis, 2005) methodology is established on the basic elements of 
Tropos (Breasciani et al., 2004). Fundamental points of this approach are: analyzing social 
issued of security in its early stage, security treated with other requirements of the system 
and security is introduced during the system design phases. These constraints are confiden-
tiality, integrity availability of some goal, soft-goal or resource. Also Secure Tropos helps 
to identify who is the threat agent, which invasion method can be used and which counter-
measures should be implemented.   
Mal-activities are extension of UML (G. Sindre, REFSQ 2007) Activity diagrams. The vi-
olator’s role is represented in a changed swim lane and shows the exploits of the system to 
achieve some gain or harm the assets. The main purpose of this modelling language is to 
reveal all possible threats of the system and to come up with security solutions.   
Business Process Model and Notation (BPMN) is a standard for business process modelling 
(Altuhhova et al., 2012) that provides a graphical notation for designating business pro-
cesses in a Business Process Diagram (BPD). BPMN is a part of IS development, as it avails 
to designate standard and optimized workflows of the organization (Cherdantseva, 2012). 
The primary purpose of BPMN is modelling of the business processes for both technical 
users and business users, by providing a notation that is intuitive to business users, yet able 
to represent intricate process semantics. BPMN acts as a bridge between business process 
design and implementation (Rodríguez, 2007).   
Misuse Case is an extension of existing standard UML use case (Mayer, N., 2007). This 
language has to be implemented at the early stage of software system development. A Mis-
use Case highlights something that should not transpire (i.e. a Negative Scenario) and the 
threats. Also Misuse case has an extension with a concept of vulnerability and definition of 
security use cases (Pauli, 2005).   
Taking into account the large amount of secure-oriented modelling languages this paper will 
study only BPMN, Misuse cases, Secure Tropos. Approach is based on identification of that 
language and to each of them is used only one running example to show alignment with 
ISSRM domain model. (Other cases which were presented in Chapter 3 will be considered 
in Appendix). The alignment is focused on concepts definition and relationship between 
them.   
After all the objective is to present different modelling languages and show their alignment 
with ISSRM domain model. The goal of later subsections is to present how these languages 
can be used to model ISSRM concepts. 
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4.2 BPMN 
The Business Process Model and Notation (BPMN) is a standard for modelling business 
processes and network services. It was released in May 2004. The primary goal of the 
BPMN standard was drawing up the deadlines understandable to all business users, from 
analysis's that create the initial project till the process developers who are responsible for 
implementation of technology. Over all other aspects of BPMN modelling besides business 
processes is out of its focus (Altuhhova et al., 2012).   
As a matter of fact to describe BPMN processes there are used block diagrams with standard 
elements. Its specification provides the ability to bind set elements of the schemes for the 
design and implementation of the executable programming languages. BPMN modelling 
can be used in three different levels (Silver, 2009).  They are analytical, executable and 
descriptive modelling. In this section, discussion will be concentrated on descriptive mod-
elling.  Its main constructs are listed in Figure 4. 
4.2.1 Alignment of BPMN to ISSRM Domain Model 
Generally BPMN notations are known to follow business processes and their limits concern 
security management of enterprise’s processes. This is a quandary, as business processes 
and security should be followed in parallel to fortify a development of the security infor-
mation systems. The foregoing discussion implies that future part of the work is concen-
trated on BPMN extensions for security risk management predicted on the BPMN alignment 
to the ISSRM concepts.   
Asset-related concepts. Altuhhova et al (2012) detected that such as task, gateway, and 
event especially sequence flow is used to describe ISSRM business assets.  The container 
constructs are aligned to the ISSRM information system assets.  ISSRM business asset rep-
resents BPMN data object and ISSRM IS asset defines BPMN data store.   
Risk-related concepts. BPMN doesn’t involve the direct means to model security risks, but 
might be used to model the negative and harmful processes (Altuhhova et al., 2012). On this 
bases BPMN pool represents ISSRM threat agent.  BPMN tasks, flow and data association 
flow show threat agent what is treated as ISSRM attack method.  Exact BPMN construct to 
model the ISSRM risk, impact, event or vulnerability is missing. Essentially those ISSRM 
concepts can be locally analyzed from BPMN model.  
Risk treatment-related concepts. BPMN task, gateway and event constructs linked to se-
quence flow and expressed on ISSRM security requirements. Nonetheless ISSRM controls 
expression is missing on BPMN.  Different security control modules are pictured in late 
system development stages of BPMN task, gateway and event constructs.   
Current research seems to validate that there BPMN is not committed to the security mod-
elling rather than business process modelling.  Despite that BPMN provides assets, their 
security risks and potential security requirements. Obviously this is not enough for security 
risk management and some language extensions are preferable to use. Aforetime performed 
alignment (Altuhhova et al., 2012) of the BPMN constructs to the concepts of the ISSRM 
domain model is done in this paper. 
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Figure 4. BPMN concerete syntax (Altuhhova,2013) 
4.2.2 Social Engineering Example in BPMN 
This section discusses different methods of social engineering attack. To illustrate the 
BPMN security extensions, below provided one chosen example, related to security criteria 
of the business assets.   
Context and asset identification. Let’s consider the following situation where the potential 
user (pool Jenny in Figure 5) receives a call and wishes to get information from the system 
(CBIS). In order to get any information Caller requests it (task Call and ask for data) while 
the user checks it from the system. Janie Acton call for data (task Maintain data, Write query 
for data), receive information (tasks Data received) and uses it (task Uses data). When 
Jenny asked data the CBIS system manages it (tasks Retrieve data, Provide data). 
Determination of security objectives. In the current case existed violation of the confiden-
tiality of information in CBIS system (it is shown by the Lock on the Data object). Violation 
of confidentiality of information caused a harm to the organization by usage of other per-
son’s private information for not intended purpose.   
From the Risk related concept in this case the caller or attacker pretended to be an em-
ployee of the same organization. Attacker said that his computer has been damaged by virus. 
In consequence of this he cannot get information to one of the vice-presidents. Caller col-
lected data thorough search to confirm his authenticity. Violator asked to see from the sys-
tem account number, phone number entry and service address. In Figure 6 it is presented that 
in pool Caller the violator asks for an information (task Calls and asks for a data) then 
receives it (task Data received) and finally uses it (task Uses data for unintended purpose). 
In this case an employee, Jenny performs same actions as it was a Good Caller. She has an 
access to data (task Maintain data) checks it from the system (task Write query for data), 
receives (task Data received) and provides it to the requestor (task Uses data).   
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Figure 5. Janie Acton’s Story- BPMN assets identification 
Henceforth Risk treatment concept for a Janie Acton’s story presented in Figure 7. Then 
the whole process will be slightly different, as Jenny asks for a verification (task Ask for 
ID) and when it is received, checks it (task ID received, Check ID). If it is not ok, she can 
decline request (task Refuse to give data). The Caller in such situation will give a not valid 
ID (task Asked ID, Provide fake ID).  
 
 
Figure 6. Janie Acton’s Story- BPMN risks identification 
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Figure 7. Janie Acton’s Story- BPMN risks treatment 
                                Table 7. ISSRM assets concepts modelled in BPMN 
 What is  … ? Which language construct expresses … ? 
Business 
asset 
Data  
Caller and its business process including 
Call and ask for data and Data received  
Jenny tasks Maintain data and Uses data 
could be considered as business asset under 
some circumstance. 
Data store   
Combination of Flow objects (tasks, sequence flow and 
events).   
 
IS asset Jenny  
Jenny’s process write query for data, data 
received. Process executed in CBIS. 
Database 
Pool  
  
Combination of Flow objects (tasks, sequence flow and 
events).  
  
Data store  
Security 
criterion 
Data confidentiality 
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                    Table 8. ISSRM risk treatment related-concepts modelled in BPMN 
 What is  … ? Which language construct expresses … ? 
Risk treatment 
decision 
Data reduction No construct 
Security 
requirement 
Ask for ID,   
After ID is received, check if ID is OK if 
not refuse to give data 
Combination of Flow Objects (tasks, gateways and 
events) using Sequence Flow   
 
Control Not proposed No construct 
                                  
4.3 Misuse case 
Sindre and Opdhal proposed a misuse case that includes graphical notation and textual 
representation to model security concerns (Sindre et al., 2005). The misuse case  is 
characterized as by an agent, who can cause a harm to stakeholders or/and to the system if 
performs his tasks successfully. In such situation the misuser is identified as a performer 
who wants to use the system with damaging intents. At the beginning using the misuse case 
it was possible to model threats, but later there was adapted the concept of security use. 
Finally Rostad has enlarged the misuse cases with the vulnerability.  
4.3.1 Alignment of SROMUC to ISSRM Domain Model 
This section is concentrated on the alignment of SROMUC (Security Risk-oriented Misuse 
Cases) with the concept in ISSRM domain model. There is an outline of the ISSRM concepts 
in Figure 3.    
Alignment of asset-related concepts. In ISSRM domain model assets are resented by Actor 
and Use case. In SROMUC a use case model the business asset and the IS asset. The IS 
asset is expressed using the supports relationship and business assets using extend and in-
cludes relationships. The ISSRM security criterion is shown in hexagon construct of SRO-
MUC. Hexagon is linked to the business use case though dotted line with constraint of re-
lationship as on ISSRM domain model security criterion with business asset (Mayer, N., 
2009).   
Alignment of risk-related concepts. A threat agent in SROMUC is shown as a misuser, 
misuse case as attack method and use case and vulnerability. A mix of misuser and misuse 
case forms a threat, threatened relationship presented in targets relationship. Rounded rec-
tangle is imported to model the impact on ISSRM concept.   
Also there are use exploits in a link between misuse case, the vulnerability leads to definition 
of the link between the misuse case and the impact. The harm is identified between an im-
pact and a business use case, negates is illustrated as a link between an impact and security 
criterion. Threat agent, attack method, vulnerability, impact are combined to represent an 
event, where risk is a combination of event and the impact (Matulevičius, R et al., 2008).   
Alignment of risk treatment-related concepts. Security requirements represented in the 
visual syntax of security use case by adding a padlock to security use case.  
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                         Table 9. ISSRM risks concepts modelled in BPMN 
 What is  … ? Which language construct expresses … ? 
Risk Malicious caller calls and asks for data, 
receives data, and uses data for not 
intended purpose b e c a u s e J e n n y h a 
s n o experience to verify the caller, this 
leads to data confidentiality negation and 
data reception for unintended use. 
Combination of Event and Impact  
 
Impact Data confidentiality negated  
Data received  
Harm to Jenny is not indicated 
Unlock   
  
Event  
Event Malicious caller calls and asks for data, 
receives data, and uses data for not 
intended purpose b e c a u s e J e n n y h a 
s n o  
experience to verify the caller  
Combination of constructs for Threat and Vulnerability 
   
 
Vulnerability Jenny has no experience to  
verify the caller 
Annotation  
  
Vulnerability point for characteristic of  
 
Threat Malicious caller calls and asks for data, 
receives data, and uses data for not 
intended purpose 
Combination of construct for Threat Agent and Attack 
method  
 
Threat agent Malicious caller Pool  
 
Attack 
method 
Call and ask for data, data received, use 
for not intended purpose 
Combination of flow objects (tasks and event) using 
Sequence Flow  
 
 
4.3.2 Social Engineering Example in SROMUC  
This section illustrates application of SROMUC modelling to the Jane Acton’s story. It is 
focused on confidentiality of information stored in CBIS system. For a better understanding 
of the case, model is divided into 3 pictures: for assets, risks, security requirements.    
Asset Model. The case is focused on Jenny and the CBIS system. An asset is only Jenny 
who is a user of the CBIS system. In order to get any information Jenny Maintain data, 
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Write query for data and Uses data. The Call and Ask for data includes Maintain data and 
includes Write query for data. Maintain data has a security criterion Confidentiality of data 
represented as a hexagon. The Provide data includes Retrieve data. According to the ISSRM 
domain model Maintain data, write query for data and Uses data has been identified as an 
IS asset that has a value to the organization. Retrieve data and Provide data are Business 
asset.  
Risk Model. In Figure 9 is presented security threat scenario. A misuser (i.e., Attacker) uses 
vulnerability (i.e., No experience to verify the caller, Jenny is not trusted) to initiate misuse 
case (i.e., Call and ask for data). In the grey filling represents a vulnerability, threat is shown 
in black. Call and ask for data exploits the fact that No experience to verify the caller. 
Threat Receive data threatens uses data.   
 
Figure 8. Asset modelling for Janie Acton’s Story 
Risk treatment model. SROMUC does not support the risk treatment concept, but it is 
possible to model a security use case for identification of security requirement. In the Figure 
10 represented security use case. It is shown by a use case diagram with a lock inside to 
mark security requirement for identified threats. The use case Jenny and Maintain data (i.e., 
IS Asset) has to include a security use case (i.e., Ask for ID). The security use case mitigates 
the misuse case (i.e., Uses data for unintended purpose). It ensures security criterion (i.e., 
Confidentiality of data) imposed by business use case (i.e., Maintain data).  
4.4 Secure Tropos 
In this section will be represented summary of another modelling language as Secure Tropos 
and its support management of IS security Risk.   
Secure Tropos (Mouratids and Giorgini, 2007a), (Mouratidis et al., 2003a) is built upon the 
Tropos methodology (Bresciano et al., 2004). It assists in growth of IS security it its devel-
opment stage. There are existing four phases (Matulevičius et al., 2012): early and late re-
quirements, architectural and detailed design. In this paper is thought-out only early and late 
requirement analysis (Bresciano et al., 2004) or early stage of the IS development.  
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Table 10. ISSRM assets concepts modelled in SROMUC 
 What is  … ? Which language construct expresses … ? 
Business 
asset 
Data  
Call and ask for data, receive data  
Under some circumstances: use cases, like 
Maintain data, Write query for data, Use 
data 
Not presented  
Use cases and appropriate link to express include.  
 
IS asset Combination of use cases, like Maintain 
data, Write query for data, Use data, 
Retrieve data, Provide data  
Home Town Electric Power 
Use case and appropriate link to express include.  
  
System boundary:  
 
Security 
criterion 
Confidentiality of data 
 Construct for security criterion, 
“hexagon” and link express constraint of. 
 
 
Figure 9. Threat modelling for Janie Acton’s Story 
4.4 1 Alignment of Secure Tropos with ISSRM 
The Secure Tropos syntax has been decided to the three construct categories of ISSRM 
domain model: asset-related concepts, risk-related concepts and risk-treatment concepts. 
Besides underlined categories of syntax this section will also take into account how ISSRM 
relations (e.g., supports, constraint of, exploits, targets, mitigates and others) can be ex-
pressed in Secure Tropos (Matulevičius et al., 2012).   
Asset-related concept. Actor, hardgoal, plan resource, softgoal constructs represent assets 
using compositions as dependency, meansends, contribution and decomposition relations. 
36 
 
Different Secure Tropos relationships can be expressed in ISSRM IS and business assets. 
Security criterion of ISSRM is expressed by softgoal and/or security constraint.    
 
Figure 10. Risk treatment modelling for Janie Acton’s Story 
Table 11. ISSRM risk treatment related-concepts modelled in SROMUC 
 What is  … ? Which language construct expresses … ? 
Risk 
treatment 
decision 
Risk reduction No constructs 
Security 
requirement 
Ask for ID  
Check if ID is OK 
  
Security use case construct and link include. 
Control Not modelled. There is a need to implement 
security policies. 
No constructs 
Risk-related concept. Standard Secure Tropos constructs can represent a threat agent of 
ISSRM as an actor, attack method as a plan, threat as a hardgoal and/or plan. Extension 
presented by Elahi and Yu (Elahi and Yu, 2007) introduces representation of vulnerability 
as a vulnerability point. Representation of threat agent, attack method and vulnerability can 
serve event of the risk. 
Risk treatment-related concepts. Actor, hardgoal, plan, softgoal and security constraints 
represent security requirements, which need to have dotted background pattern. Represen-
tation of the ISSRM security requirements concept in Secure Tropos is shown mitigates 
relationship (Matulevičius et al., 2012).  
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Table 12. ISSRM risks concepts modelled in SROMUC 
 What is  … ? Which language construct expresses … ? 
Risk Caller calls and asks for data, receives data, 
and uses data for unintended purpose 
because no experience to verify the caller 
when maintaining the data. That leads to 
negation of  
confidentiality of data as Jenny is not 
trusted and harm to maintain data. 
Combination of Event and Impact.  
 
Impact Negate confidentiality of data  Jenny is not 
trusted (harm to IS asset)  
Harm to maintain data (harm to business 
asset) 
   
Impact construct and appropriate links to express harm 
and negation of security criterion 
Event Caller calls and asks for data, receives data, 
and uses data for unintended purpose 
because no experience to verify the caller 
when maintaining the data 
  
Combination of constructs used to express threat and 
vulnerability 
Vulnerability No experience to verify the caller when 
maintaining the data   
Vulnerability use case 
Threat Caller calls and asks for data, receives data, 
and uses data for unintended purpose 
  
Combination of misuser and misuse cases.  
Misuse cases are linked by include. 
Threat agent Caller 
 
Attack 
method 
Call and ask for data, Receive data, Use 
data for unintended purpose 
  
Misuse case construct and link to include cases. 
 
4.4.2 Social Engineering Example in Secure Tropos 
This section illustrates application of Secure Tropos modelling to the chosen case - Jane 
Acton’s story. Model is divided into 3 pictures: assets, risks, security requirements.    
Asset Model. The first figure 11 represents an asset identification in Secure Tropos. In the 
picture is shown goals (e.g., Query received, Provide data, Data provided, Data from CBIS 
received) plans (e.g., Call and ask for data, Uses data, Write query for data) actors (e.g., 
CBIS, Caller, Jenny). It is also possible to identify security objectives by representation of 
softgoal (e.g., Confidentiality) with security constraints (e.g., confidentiality of data).   
Risk Model. Figure 12 presents potential risks of Janie Acton’s story. Event that concen-
trates provided figure called Social Engineering attack. It represents a situation, where threat 
agent calls as an employee in order to get required information. After indentation of the 
possible risk, we need to identify threat, vulnerability, and threat agent and attack method. 
Malicious caller has a threat (e.g., Use data for not intended purpose) by Data provided. 
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Caller attacks Data provided through exploiting the vulnerability identified in Uses data. 
Thus exploit link shows a relationship between an attack method and a vulnerable IS asset.   
Security requirement. In order to mitigate the identified risk about Social engineering at-
tack, it has been chosen risk reduction. Security requirement is presented in dotted back-
ground pattern. In our case it is Check ID. In this situation, the Confidentiality of data also 
becomes a security requirement mitigating the risk.   
Tables 7-15 presents a semantic alignment of the language constructs to the concept of the 
ISSRM model. These tables representation has been done to each of language that this paper 
covers. At this stage of analysis such tables helped in understanding of semiotic clarity of 
the SRM language with respect to the ISSRM domain model. Further section is concentrated 
on discussion of founding and identification of one modelling language that has a better 
alignment with ISSRM concept.  
 
 
 
Figure 11. Janie Acton’s Story- Secure Tropos assets identification 
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Figure 12. Janie Acton’s Story- Secure Tropos risks identification 
Table 13. ISSRM assets concepts modelled in Secure Tropos 
 What is …? Which Language construct expresses …? 
Business 
Asset 
Data 
Call and ask for data, Data  
provided 
Jenny and Caller 
Under some circumstances as business 
asset could be considered write query for 
data and data provided.  
Not represented 
Combination of Actor, hardgoal and plan that support 
their dependency 
 
IS Asset Jenny 
Jenny’s process write query for data, uses 
data, data provided Process executed in 
CBIS as query received, provided data,  
data from CBIS received 
CBIS 
Actor 
 
Composition of the plan,hardgoal using decomposition 
and means-ends relationships
 
 
Security 
Requirement 
Confidentiality of data Confidentiality Security constraint contribution  
 
Softgoal  
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Figure 13. Janie Acton’s Story- Secure Tropos risks treatment 
Table 14. ISSRM risk treatment related-concepts modelled in Secure Tropos 
 What is …? Which Language construct expresses …? 
Risk 
treatment 
decision 
Risk reduction No constructs 
Security 
requirement 
Check ID Plan  that has dotted background pattern 
 
Control Not proposed No constructs 
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Table 15. ISSRM risks concepts modelled in Secure Tropos 
 What is …? Which Language construct expresses …? 
Risk Malicious caller calls and asks for data, 
received data and uses data for not intended 
purpose to exploit use of data and attack 
data using social engineering attack to 
negate confidentiality of data 
Composition of Event and Impact 
 
  
Impact Social engineering attack negates 
confidentiality of data 
Impacts 
 
Event Malicious caller calls and asks for data, 
receives data, uses data for not intended 
purpose to exploit use of data and attack 
data ( Data provided) using social 
engineering attack 
Combination of an Agent , goal, plan, exploits and 
vulnerability point 
 
Threat 
 
Vulnerabiltiy Not clearly identified but points out that 
vulnerable is use of data 
Is not modelled, but vulnerability point identified the 
attributes of the assets(plan) 
 
Threat Malicious caller calls and asks for data, 
receives data and uses data for not intended 
purpose 
Combination of constructs for Threat Agent and Attack 
method 
  
Threat agent Malicious Caller Agent 
 
Attack 
method 
Call and ask for data, data received, use 
data for unintended purpose 
Agent executes plan and goal using mean ends, 
decomposition relationships 
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4.5 Discussion 
From the information obtained, through the study of different modelling languages, this 
section discusses our experience through use of these languages and alignment of them with 
ISSRM concept.  
The first step of study and alignment of modelling languages, we also have carefully applied 
these modelling languages to a given case. Certainly based on our experience we have al-
ready made our mind regarding how easy it is to understand certain aspects in each of these 
languages. Despite the fact that BPMN has been introduced with the aim to the business 
users, it supports security management concepts (in an enterprise level). Based on our sub-
jective opinion it has several advantages: clear description of processes and tasks performed 
by certain actors, visual reproduction of security objectives and vulnerability. Overall we 
count BPMN modelling language as more structured than other two. Moving on to Misuse 
case modelling language, it also has its own convenience in language use. For example, 
actors’ illustration; separate constructs for security criterion, vulnerability, impact, security 
requirements, and attack method with a clear link to each concept. Lastly, Secure Tropos 
has its own language construct expression to each concept. All of them are simply to com-
prehend based on different forms and colors. Each user of these modelling languages might 
find something special in a particular language. We like better BPMN modelling language 
as count it as the most optimal and ease to use. Clear structural approach that is used in this 
language is one of the main aspects that attracts us. It should be noted that this observation 
is purely subjective, but it is done to express the hypothesis to be investigated in Section 5. 
With regard to our analyses of BPMN, Misuse case and Secure Tropos we have done tables 
that we concentrated on theoretical part of language constructs. It is presented in Table 16. 
Also after each representation of modelling language and its application to the chosen ex-
ample as a summary has been done separate tables. To readers convenience each table has 
been divided based on asset-related concepts, risk-related concepts and risk treatment-re-
lated concept. Based on Table 16 it is relatively easy to identify one common aspect in all 
three modelling languages, their absence of control and risk treatment construct. Probably 
it is better to start with Secure Tropos constructs as in most cases of ISSRM concept align-
ment they are used in a combination off their own constructs ( to express one concept).  
Separate construct is used for security criterion, vulnerability, threat agent. Same separate 
constructs in the rest two modelling languages, however, for Misuse case added impact con-
struct. Impact in Misuse case represented by impact construct. As vulnerability, security 
criterion and threat agent in each studied modelling language has its own construct it might 
be advisable to take a look to each of them. In BPMN vulnerability is characterized by text 
annotation V, Misuse case uses special vulnerability use case and in Secure Tropos it is not 
modelled, however vulnerability point helps in identification of the attributes. In case of a 
threat agent identification in BPMN it represents pool, Misuse case has misuser and Secure 
Tropos – an Actor. Lastly, security criterion is represented by security construct in Misuse 
case, Softgoal and Security constraint in Secure Tropos. In BPMN security criterion shown 
text annotation and lock. However, lock represent security need, not security criterion. Other 
ISSRM concepts can be identified by association with different constructs. Illustration of a 
threat in a Misuse case is a combination of a misuser and misuse cases. Also misuse cases 
are linked by include. In Secure Tropos it is presented by a combination of attacker, goal, 
plan constructs. BPMN uses pool with a combination of flow objects (tasks and event) using 
sequence flow to illustrate threat.   
43 
 
Table 16. Concept alignment of security languages with ISSRM domain model 
ISSRM 
Concepts  
BPMN constructs  Misuse cases con-
structs  
Secure Tropos con-
structs  
Asset  Task, Even, Sequence 
Flow  
Actor  Actor, Goal, Soft-
goal, Plan, Resource  
Business 
Asset  
Data Object, Task,   
Event, Sequence Flow  
Use case  Actor, Goal, Soft-
goal, Plan, Resource  
IS asset  Task, Event, Sequence 
Flow, Datastore, Pool  
Use case  Actor, Goal, Soft-
goal, Plan, Resource  
Security 
criterion  
Text Annotation Lock( 
not security   
criterion, but security 
need)  
Security construct  Security constraint, 
Softgoal  
Risk  Task, Event, Sequence 
flow, Message Flow, 
Pool, Text Annotation, 
V ( characteristics of 
vulnerability), Unlock, 
Message Flow, Event  
Misuser, Misuse 
case, Vulnerability 
use case and Impact 
constraint  
Composition of a 
Threat and Impacts 
relationship  
Impact  Unlock, Message Flow, 
Event  
Impact constraint  Contribution between 
the threat and soft-
goal  
Event  Task, Event, Sequence 
flow, Message Flow, 
Pool, Text Annotation, 
V ( characteristics of 
vulnerability)  
Misuser, Misuse 
case and  Vulnera-
bility use case  
Threat  
Threat  Task, Event, Sequence 
flow, Message Flow, 
Pool  
Misuser and Misuse 
case  
Goal, Plan  
Vulnerabil-
ity  
Text Annotation, V 
( characteristics of 
vulnerability)  
Vulnerability use 
case  
Not modelled, but 
vulnerability point 
identifies the attrib-
utes of the assets 
(plan) 
Threat 
agent  
Pool  Misuser  Actor  
Attack 
method  
Task, Event, Sequence 
flow, Message Flow  
Misuse case  Plan, relationship at-
tacks  
Risk treat-
ment  
None  None  Not mode  
Security 
Require-
ment  
Task, Even, Sequence   
Flow, Gateway, Mes-
sage   
Flow  
Misuse case  Actor, Goal, Soft-
goal, Plan, Resource, 
Security constraint  
Control  None  None  None 
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5 An Experiment Report Outline 
Taking into account different modelling languages, which were discussed in chapter 4, we 
are interested in identification and investigation of  modelling languages that could be better 
understood by ordinary people. To identify one language construct we prepared a 
questionnaire and collected some results from participants. Based on obtained results, some 
findings will be done.   
This chapter has following structure: section 1 presents problem statement, section 2 
demonstrates study design and how results were calculated, section 3 covers details of the 
empirical study, section 4 introduces results, section 5 considers threats to validity, section 
6 discusses findings with other papers and finally, section 7 concludes results of the study. 
5.1 Problem Statement 
In this paper analysis will be concentrated on the security risk-oriented modelling languages. 
In the scope of this research is included BPMN, Secure Tropos and Misuse case. Those 
languages have an extension to express information security risk management. The aim of 
this research is to investigate whether ordinary model readers understand created figures 
and do those models carry the security related information. Thus, research questions are: 
RQ1: Which language is easier to comprehend for the security risk management?   
RQ2: Which model is better perceived by participants?   
As we consider, results might be based on participant’s background and experience. Over-
all assumed result of the study is that:   
H1: Results of BPMN language concepts and constructs will be better than in Misuse case 
and Secure Tropos  
5.2 Planning of Questionnaire 
Questionnaire has been prepared from the modelled case using BPMN, Secure Tropos and 
Misuse case language constructs. In Appendix E, F and H are presented examples of ques-
tionnaires that all participants of this research have received. Step by step composition of 
this questionnaire looks as follows:   
 Learned and studied regarding BPMN, Secure Tropos and misuse case   
 Chosen case which will be constructed in BPMN, Secure Tropos and misuse case    
 Prepared model for one case in those three modelling languages   
 Constructed questionnaires   
 Prepared answers to those questionnaires   
 Distributed questionnaires to the participants of the course on “ Principles of Se-
cure Software Design”   
 Collected results  
Feedbacks from respondents allows to compare those models and many necessary analysis. 
In a survey document has been introduced modelled case with different concepts. 
To understand the participants readability of models, on survey were presented two rows. 
One of them requested to identify construct and second one was done to represent language 
construct expressions.The aim of this questionnaire was to investigate the understanding of 
modelling language among responders.  
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5.3 Experiment Operation 
To answer a research question defined in Section 1, we made an analysis of collected data 
from students. Empirical study has been conducted at the University of Tartu during the 
course on “Principles of Secure Software Design”. The course was taken by the Cyber-
security study program. Participants took part in lectures and workshops on security risk 
management, security modelling, security requirements, and model driven security and de-
velopment processes of the secure software. The questionnaire has been hand out during the 
lecture.    
The study consists of few stages. Participants were requested to analyze diagrams of security 
risk model in all three concepts together and fill the open-ended questionnaire. The ques-
tionnaire requested to classify the ISSRM concept expressions in provided diagrams. Cor-
rect answers to those questions are presented in Tables 7-15. Also they are divided to asset 
related concepts, risk related concepts and risk-treatment related concepts. In risk related 
concept is presented vulnerability. It is conferred in concept of Jenny has no experience to 
verify the caller (BPMN uses text annotation and vulnerability point is identified by V, mis-
use case uses vulnerability use case, in Secure Tropos shown by vulnerability point). Control 
is not represented in all modelling languages concept expressions. If there are several con-
cepts that represent one construct, then preliminary table of correct answers was divided 
based on actors. If even one of the concept has been mentioned by a participant, it has been 
included in the sheet of correct answers (see Appendix I, J and K).  
For example business asset has several concepts as Data, Caller and its business process 
including Call and ask for data, Receive data, Jenny tasks Maintain data and Uses data. 
They were divided into three sections of correct answers as: Data, Caller, Jenny. Even when 
responder mentioned one process Call and ask for data, it has been counted as a correct 
answer in the field of Caller. Second column of the questionnaire has requested from re-
sponders to fill language constructs that are used to model the ISSRM concepts. Responders 
needed to identify the constructs or their combination of them as shown in Tables 7-15. 
There are no constructs to risk treatment decision and control in both modelling languages. 
If there is a combination of flow objected using sequence flow, events, tasks and only one 
correct answer is mentioned, then same technique as in case of concept expressions has been 
used.  
5.4 Analysis and Interpretation 
Students that took part in this research were not aware of intend of this study. They were 
informed to fill provided questionnaire based on they understanding of provided task. Pri-
marily all of participants were not intended to participate in an experiment; they were par-
ticipating a course.   
Concept: Total amount of received answers is 34: (i) twelve responses in identification of 
BPMN constructs were identified as valid (ii) ten responses in identification of misuse con-
structs were valid (iii) twelve responses in identification of Secure Tropos. These numbers 
are included only as valid responses. Table 17 represents the results of the correct answers 
identified by the respondents. More detailed data of answers is presented in Appendix. To 
have a better understanding of results that have been received in the process of response and 
analyze correctness of provided hypothesis, further part is concentrated on evaluation of 
them.   
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Table 17. Comparison of concepts created using SRM language 
ISSRM Concepts BPMN concept MUC concept Secure Tropos 
concept 
Number of responses 12 10 12 
Business asset 42% 53% 63% 
IS asset 17% 20% 44% 
Security criterion 100% 90% 67% 
Risk 60% 35% 46% 
Impact 22% 50% 83% 
Event 75% 55% 56% 
Vulnerability 83% 80% 33% 
Threat 58% 30% 50% 
Threat agent 92% 100% 100% 
Attack method 14% 27% 42% 
Risk treatment decision 17% 100% 58% 
Security requirement 72% 35% 58% 
Control  0% 0% 8% 
Overall 652% 675% 708% 
 
Based on overall results it is evident that Misuse case is understood better than BPMN. Four 
ISSRM concepts (namely, event, vulnerability, threat, and threat agent) are identified in 
both languages. However five of concepts in BPMN are better recognized (i.e., risk, attack 
method, risk treatment decision, security requirement, control) than in misuse case.  As seen 
from the table the overall results in Secure Tropos are better than in misuse case. Business 
asset, IS asset, risk, impact, event, threat, attack method, security requirement and control 
are understood by most responders in Secure Tropos. Also, only in Secure Tropos modelling 
language some responders could identify control concept. 
In comparison of all three modelling languages BPMN concepts has better results in security 
criterion, risk, event, vulnerability, threat, and security requirements identification. In Mis-
use case all participants identified risk treatment decision. Following data from the Table 
17 comes out that Secure Tropos concept got better results in evaluation of all received data 
among responders. Business asset, IS asset, Impact, Threat agent, Attack method, Risk treat-
ment decision, Security requirement and control were identified in Secure Tropos by higher 
amount of participant.  
 
Constructs: Total amount of received answers is 30: (i) ten responses in identification of 
BPMN constructs were identified as valid (ii) eight responses in identification of misuse 
constructs were valid (iii) twelve responses in identification of Secure Tropos. These 
numbers are included only as valid responses. Couple handed works were excluded due to 
the totally incorrect filling of the questionnaire. Obviously, such responders had a problem 
in understanding the task or/and the model. In each of the modelling languages questionnaire 
two responders have not filled construct’s expression section. Main reason of such lack 
understanding of provided task might be difference in the disciplines that they have studies 
before. That led to misinterpretation of the assignment and incorrect filling of questionnaire. 
In Table 18 presented results of understanding of constructs in analyzed modelling lan-
guages. The difference in concepts identification score between Secure Tropos and misuse 
case is very large. Moving on to the constructs of Secure Tropos modelling language all 
aspects were better identified excluding vulnerability, control and impact.  
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Table 18. Comparison of construct using SRM languages 
ISSRM concept BPMN construct MUC construct Secure Tropos 
construct 
Number of responses 10 8 12 
Business asset 36% 37% 100% 
IS asset 32% 15% 79% 
Security criterion 45% 63% 79% 
Risk 55% 12% 42% 
Impact 32% 50% 42% 
Event 73% 40% 46% 
Vulnerability 82% 62% 46% 
Threat 82% 62% 83% 
Threat agent 91% 62% 100% 
Attack method 82% 12% 100% 
Risk treatment decision 73% 12% 17% 
Security requirement 82% 37% 75% 
Control 55% 12% 8% 
Overall 820% 487% 817% 
 
Taking everything into consideration it is also should be compared Secure Tropos and 
BPMN constructs. Based on results of BPMN and Secure Tropos constructs it is obvious 
that BPMN has shown higher results by 3%. Secure Tropos constructs have been better 
understood in following aspects: Business Asset, IS asset, security criterion, impact, threat, 
threat agent.  Others have shown good results in BPMN.   
General results: On provided Table 19 are included general underling of concept and con-
struct. It represents general understanding of those three modelling languages in percentage 
form. Generally, percentage wise understanding of constructs is higher than concepts. Busi-
ness asset, IS asset, threat, attack method, risk treatment, security requirement and control 
are easily identified in the form of constructs. Concepts are have received higher score in 
following aspects: Business Asset, Security criterion, Impact, Event, Vulnerability, Threat, 
Threat agent, Security requirement.  
Table 19. General understanding of languages 
ISSRM concept General understanding of 
concepts 
General understanding of 
construct 
Number of responses 34 30 
Business asset 53% 58% 
IS asset 27% 42% 
Security criterion 86% 62% 
Risk 47% 36% 
Impact 52% 41% 
Event 62% 56% 
Vulnerability 65% 63% 
Threat 57% 76% 
Threat agent 85% 84% 
Attack method 23% 65% 
Risk treatment decision 29% 34% 
Security requirement 56% 71% 
Control 7% 25% 
Overall 649% 713% 
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5.5 Threat to Validity 
Validity of obtained data deals with the experiment’s treatment. Treatment to the partici-
pants were given on principles of the subject, but not to the languages of security risk man-
agement. Taking into account that validity depends on the questionnaire, it has been re-
viewed thoughtfully.   
 The first possible threat might be a misinterpretation of the ISSRM concepts. Self-
study materials were provided to participants of a questionnaire to mitigate that 
threat.  Also, based on the some studies a person who was in charge for treatment 
and the experiment design brings more advantage to the research. In this study has 
been used same technique. It helped to make the terminology of the questionnaire in 
the secure risk management questionnaire and treatment more consistent.   
 Next threat might be students as usually they have a little will to participate in the 
assessment of the secure risk management languages and their models. As this threat 
reduction, students were required to fill questionnaire as a reward in the subject 
points.  
 A rather small account of participants may represent a minor threat to validity. 
 Some obtained results have very small difference between languages and it is hard 
to refer as a certain preference or understanding of one modelling language. 
 
5.6 Discussion 
In order to illustrate a comparison of running results that were obtained during conducted 
survey, author decided to study a paper by R. Matulevičius, 2014. Despite the different ob-
jectives of studies, there were also done research in understanding of language concepts and 
constructs. Upon the study of this paper, author found out contrasting results. 
The findings of paper (R. Matulevičius, 2014) regarding language concept are very differ-
ent. This paper results and data presented in R. Matulevičius, 2014 showed same infor-
mation regarding better understood BPMN concept (security requirement) and Secure 
Tropos (risk treatment decision).  Identified ISSRM concepts showed better results in com-
parison with analyzed modelling languages. On the model level in this paper better under-
standing showed Secure Tropos concept however in (R. Matulevičius, 2014) paper findings 
result that BPMN was best-comprehended model. 
Next aspect that has been investigated in this paper is language constructs.  Results of survey 
show that BPMN construct is better understood by participants. However in the paper of R. 
Matulevičius, 2014 the best perceived SRM language became Secure Tropos.  Also in this 
paper is noted that overall number of valid responses has been only four.  Overall score of 
compared modelling languages is not very large to have certain statement. In our paper dif-
ference between results is only 3% percent and number of valid responses differ. All these 
aspects leave a need for a further deeper analysis in that area. 
The identified results in this paper and finding in R. Matulevičius, 2014 do not match and 
confirm each other in several aspects. The reason of such difference might be some threats 
to validity that were mentioned in section 5.5. Likewise different domain caused contrasting 
results. In this paper we have reviewed Social Engineering, but in R. Matulevičius, 2014 
was System Engineering. Also it might be good to take into account the total number of 
valid answers that were received in each case. 
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5.7 Summary 
In this chapter has been analyzed three secure risk management languages - BPMN, Secure 
Tropos and Misuse case. In other sections we have covered problem statement, planning of 
questionnaire, experiment operation, analysis and interpretation, threat to validity. The aim 
of this part of paper was to find out which language’s concepts or constructs are better un-
derstood. Below are provided some findings, based on research questions and hypothesis.   
RQ1: Which language is easier to comprehend for the security risk management? 
BPMN concepts that have better results in security criterion, risk, event, vulnerability, 
threat, and security requirements identification. All left concepts were easily identified in 
MUC modelling language. The sum of all obtained results in each language provided the 
bases to state that BPMN is better than Misuse case. In comparison of Secure Tropos and 
Misuse case, indubitably Secure Tropos showed better results among participants. Calcula-
tion of the sum of obtained results gave the bases to assert that Secure Tropos concepts are 
better than BPMN.  In comparison of all three modelling languages overall obtained results 
showed that Secure Tropos concepts are easier to comprehend for the security risk manage-
ment to ordinary users. 
RQ2: Which model better perceived by participants?   
Users can understand BPMN modelling constructs better than in Misuse case and Secure 
Tropos. Nine constructs out of thirteen have shown great results in Secure Tropos in com-
parison with Misuse case. If compare Secure Tropos and BPMN, BPMN has higher score 
in understanding of: security criterion, risk, event, vulnerability, threat, and security re-
quirement. In comparison of concepts and constructs understanding, constructs received 
higher amount than concepts. Business asset, IS asset, threat, attack method, risk treatment, 
security requirement and control are easily identified in the form of constructs. Concepts 
are have received higher score in following aspects: Business Asset, Security criterion, Im-
pact, Event, Vulnerability, Threat, Threat agent, Security requirement. 
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6 Conclusion and Future Work 
This chapter summaries what has been done in the paper, state the limitations for the work 
and identified a contribution of future research.  
6.1 Conclusion 
In this thesis has been reviewed various approaches and standards with regard of ISSRM 
domain model. Also one case from the book of Kevin Mitnick “The art of Deception” with 
application them into three different modelling languages with their alignment to the ISSRM 
domain model. This paper introduces figures of BPMN, Secure Tropos and misuse case to 
asset, risk and security requirement modelling. We assumed that based on studied language 
constructs and concepts understanding BPMN will be chosen during the research process. 
Then has been conducted a survey in order to evaluate and confirm or deny our hypotheses 
regarding which modelling language is better understood by ordinary users. This allowed 
us to answer to our research question.   
RQ: What modelling approach is most suitable for social engineering analysis? 
In order to introduce different modelling approaches and their support with security risk 
management standards and methods, first of all, studied some existing standards and mod-
elling approaches. In this paper also have been taken into consideration alignment of mod-
elling languages with security risk method as the ISSRM domain model. We have selected 
one social engineering case and analysed it with BPMN, Misuse case and Secure Tropos. 
To understand what modelling approach is most suitable and understandable for social en-
gineering analysis survey has been conducted.  This led to the result that overall BPMN 
constructs and Secure Tropos concepts are preferred by users. Also based on collected re-
sults, we tried to make a parallel between understanding of concepts and constructs for par-
ticipants. Percentage wise understanding of constructs showed higher results than concepts. 
Business asset, IS asset, threat, attack method, risk treatment, security requirement and 
control are easily identified in the form of constructs. Concepts are have received higher 
score in following aspects: Business Asset, Security criterion, Impact, Event, Vulnerability, 
Threat, Threat agent, Security requirement.  
In conclusion, our analyses showed that security risk aware Secure Tropos is evaluated 
better regarding the concept recognition of security risk-oriented  BPMN and Misuse cases. 
However the result is not significant. Similarly, we observe that security risk oriented /aware 
BPMN and Secure Tropos are rather equal (and better accessed than security risk oriented 
Misuse cases) regarding their construct recognition. But then again in different case study 
situation can change because of the subjectivity and the chosen case. 
6.2 Limitations 
The work reported in this thesis has several limitation. The limitations that were noticed 
are:   
 The ISSRM domain model that was picked in Chapter 2 is one of the research as-
sumption. However, it might interesting to take a look to other security risk methodologies 
and do a research using them.   
 The study regarding methodological part on how to use models to support ISSRM 
has been started in Chapter 4. There is presented a limitation to the work which is based on 
usability of a modelling support for ISSRM.   
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 The conclusion that has been achieved is based on the evaluations that were limited 
due to specific chosen security risk methodology and modelling languages.   
 In the comparison of modelling languages, only conceptual support has been pre-
sented. However, it might be necessary to consider metric level to have a full overview of 
the language.   
 The validation is limited due to specific background of respondents and included 
threats to validity. They were highlighted in Chapter 5.  
 The scope of this work is limited to only three modelling languages. 
6.3 Future Work 
The Contribution and the limitation of this work point out some open issues for further re-
search:   
 Validation of obtained results through further research. The extension proposed for 
modelling languages could be further validation by using metrics. 
 Validation of the domain model through use of different standards and methods. 
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Appendix 
I. Social Engineering Cases 
Case: Code breaking 
An employee who is working on a contract has an access to procedures of transmission and 
the ability to observe the actions of other employees. Thus he learned that the bank employ-
ees received an everyday code. Employees receive every day new code that is not easy to 
remember. That is why they were recording it on a piece of paper and put it somewhere in 
sight. In this particular November day Rifkin walked into this room with a special visit. He 
wanted to look at this piece of paper. Entering the room, he fiddled a bit with his work, 
making sure that the backup system works correctly with the main system. Meanwhile, he 
quietly read and remember the code on sticky piece of paper. A few minutes later he came 
out. Leaving the room about 3 hours in the afternoon, he went straight to the pay phones in 
the marble lobby of the building, dropped a coin and dialed room for transfers. Then he 
changed his hat, transformed from Stanley Rifkin, bank consultant to Michael Hansen, an 
employee of the International Department of the Bank. Girl FPIC internal number. Rifkin 
heart skipped a beat, it was a question that he did not expect something slipped out of his 
attention during training. He said that the call back to check this number. He again changed 
his hat and called to another bank, this time, sounding an employee of the premises for 
transfers. He received a number and call again to the girl. Few days later Rifkin flew to 
Switzerland to take their money.  
Table 20. Example of managing Code breaking security risk 
Business asset Daily code to each wire transformation, internal number 
IS asset Wire room, employees who receive daily code 
Security Criterion Confidentiality of received code, confidentiality of internal num-
ber, integrity of wire transformation process 
Impact Employees are not trusted, negation of basic security rules 
Threat agent A person who has an access to the wire room, knows the process 
of transaction and knows how to get missing information within 
that organization. 
Attack method  Person worked in the targeted organization and based on obser-
vation of internal employees found a weakness of daily actions. 
Attacker got to the targeted room and took a look to the piece of 
paper with necessary information. He remembered it and then 
used it to transfer money from one account to another. 
Security requirement Security requirement Technologies like authentication devices 
(for proving identity), access control (for managing access to files 
and system resources), and intrusion detection systems (the elec-
tronic equivalent of burglar alarms) are necessary to a corporate 
security program. 
Control Deploying countermeasures to protect the organization 
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Case: The Engineer Tap 
Lady decided to organize a raid on the cellular service provider to see whether it was 
possible to find there a few engineers who might be tempted to move to a competitor. She 
could not just call the communications center and say, "Let me talk to someone with five 
years of experience as an engineer." Instead, for obvious reasons, she began the hunt for 
talent to find pieces of information that seem very minor, information that people of 
companies say almost anyone who asked. First call: Registrar attacks, using the name Didi 
Sands, make a call to the corporate office by cell phone service. To provide themselves with 
fallback in case the call to the Transportation Department will not give what she was looking 
for, Didi also said that she wants to talk to the Department of Real Estate. And just as the 
registrar gave her the number. When Didi asked to connect it with the Transport, receptionist 
tried, but the line was busy. Then Didi asked for the third issue - the department works with 
the accounts - located in the corporate headquarters in Austin, Texas. Registrar asked him 
to wait and disconnected from the line. She told the security service that has received a 
suspicious phone call, and I thought that there is something strange. It was a small, but 
typical trouble everyday work registrar. After about a minute recorder back on line, the 
Accounting department looked the number and connected Didi. Second call: Peggy. Just 
chatted for a long time with someone wanting to be helpful, Didi acquired a number of 
settlement center, which she needed - one of those pieces of information that no one thinks 
to defend, because he can not represent any value to an outsider. The third call: Useful wrong 
number. She has started with a call to the Department for Real Estate, pretending to hit the 
wrong number.She stated that she was an employee who has lost his corporate directory, 
and asked if he was calling about a new copy. The man replied that the printed copy is 
already outdated, because all of this is available on the corporate website. Didi said she 
prefers to use a copy of the paper, and the man told her to call the Publisher, and then, 
perhaps, only to a little chat with sexy-sounding lady on the phone, looked up the number 
and helpfully gave her. The fourth call: Bart Publishers. She of said hard copy would be 
preferable, even if it is a bit dated. Barth said that she must fill out a form and send 
requisition emu.Didi said that she had no hand forms, and could not Bart kindly fill out the 
form for her? He agreed with not too much enthusiasm, and Didi told him the data. Rather 
than address the fictional contractor, she reported number that social engineers call reset 
mail, in this case, the mailing address of the company where her company rented mailboxes 
specifically for situations like this.Now instead of working with a shovel had to work hard 
handles: We needed a settlement center, who come by for delivery directory. Fine - Didi 
gave a settlement center for Thousand Oaks. Few days later when he arrived corporate 
directory, Didi found that he was even more awards than she had expected: It was not only 
a list of names and phone numbers, but also shows who is working for whom - the corporate 
structure of the whole organization.  
Case: Number please 
Offensive called the official telephone number of the company, in the center of the 
destination mechanized lines (Mechanized Line Assignment Center). The man who called, 
should be aware that information on unpublished rooms are available only to authorized 
persons. It is assumed that the center of the known only to employees of the company. And 
if the information is never made public, who could refuse to help the company's employees 
do the heavy work? She sympathized with him, it was the most difficult days at work, and 
she broke the rules a bit to help a colleague with a solution to the problem. She told him the 
current number and address for each of the cable pairs.  
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Table 21. Example of managing The Engineer Tap security risk 
Business asset Number of settlement center 
IS asset Employees, cellular service provider 
Security Criterion Integrity of department’s phone numbers, confidentiality of 
phone numbers of departments 
Impact Loss of phone number 
Vulnerability Employee of the organization is not experienced to verify the 
caller  
Threat agent Caller who knows how to use phone system, get necessary phone 
number, whom and what to ask 
Attack method Caller by making several calls to different departments and fi-
nally got to publishing department. Attacker asked a copy of cor-
porate directory and employee sent to delivery directory after a 
filled necessary form by himself. 
Security requirement To verify that the person really worked there and not provide 
phone number, especially internal 
Control Deploying countermeasures to protect the organization. Every 
company needs a written, well-publicized policy on disclosure of 
this type of information. The safeguards should include maintain-
ing an audit log that records instances when sensitive information 
is disclosed to people outside of the company. 
Case: Young man on the run 
The man, whom we'll call Frank Parsons, was on the run for many years, while the federal 
wanted list for participation in the underground anti-war group in the 1960s. For people like 
Frank, with its advanced computer skills (skills and social engineer, although he never 
mentioned this when applying for) finding a good job is not usually a problem. Except in 
cases where the organization is limited in the media, people with good computer skills are 
usually in high demand and it is easy to settle. Frank quickly found a highly paid, permanent 
job near his home. Simply classified, he thought. But when he began to fill in the 
questionnaire, it was faced with a surprise. The employer is required to provide a copy of 
the applicant's criminal characteristics, which he had to bring himself out of the state police. 
A stack of documents include a form with place for fingerprints. Even if only the required 
impression of right index finger, but it would have been reconciled with the imprint of the 
FBI database, soon he would have to work in the food service federal prison (shelter). On 
the other hand, Frank had the idea that he could avoid it. Perhaps the fingerprint templates 
are not sent from the State of the FBI. To find out whether there are his fingerprints in the 
database he called the patrol of state .When answered the phone a local expert, Frank asked 
a series of questions about what system they use, the possibilities of research and storage of 
fingerprints. Were they a hardware problem? They are connected with a card file prints 
national information center or work within the state? Is the equipment easy enough for 
anyone who is trained using it? The answer was music to his ears: they are not linked to the 
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national center, they only reconciled to the criminal database state (Criminal Information 
Index).  
Table 22. Example of managing number please security risk 
Business asset Information on unpublished rooms 
IS asset Employee, check of the destination mechanized lines  
Security Criterion Integrity of Information on unpublished rooms, confidentiality of 
Information on unpublished rooms 
Impact Negation of security requirements, Employee is not trusted 
Vulnerability Employee of the organization is not experienced to verify the 
caller 
Threat agent Caller who knows how to use phone system, how to get office 
phone number of the organization and gain trust of employee 
Attack method Caller who knows how to play on sympathy and get necessary 
information 
Security requirement Not provide private phone number 
Control Deploying countermeasures to protect the organization  
 
Case: Gas Attack 
Project Art Sealy. Art Sealy refused to work free editor, when opened, I could make more 
money by doing research for writers and commercial firms. He was contacted by a man who 
wrote a book on the cabinet during the reign of Nixon. He was looking for someone who 
could find the sensational news about William Simon (William E. Simon), the Minister of 
Finance. Mr. Simon died, but the author was named a woman who was in his state. He was 
sure that she lived in the District of Columbia, but could not find the address. To her name 
was not specified phone, or at least was not among those listed. So he called me. Sure, no 
problem, I told him. This work, which usually can be performed using one or two calls, if 
you know what you are doing. We can assume that each local utility company provides 
information beyond its limits. Of course, you have to lie a little.  
Case: The first call- Andrea Lopez 
Women in social engineering have a clear advantage due to the fact that they can use their 
sexuality to get to the cooperation. First Up: Andrea Lopez. Andrea Lopez responded to a 
phone call in the video box office, where she worked, and immediately smiled always nice 
when a client says good things about the service. The one who called and said that he had 
left a very good impression of the video rental service, and he wanted to send a letter to the 
manager, and report it. He asked the manager's name and postal address. Andrea told him 
that the manager is Tommy Allison, and gave the address. When the caller wanted to hang 
up, he had a different idea, write to the office and for that the mind needed to know the 
number of the store. The girl also gave him this information. He thanked added something 
nice about it, how useful was it, and said goodbye. Second call Ginny. The caller introduced 
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himself Tomy Alison store manager 863 in Forest Park. The reason for the call was a 
customer who wants to rent Rocky 5, but they do not have it in the store. She provided him 
with the necessary information. Three or four times over the next few weeks, Ginny received 
calls from Tommy to help in a particular case. These were the type of legitimate requests, 
and he was always very friendly, did not try to push strongly. He was very talkative. Once 
Tommy called and asked about problems with computers. Under this pretext Tommy gave 
the customer's name and address, and Ginny found it in the computer. She gave Tommy 
account number. Due to the fact that the client with him were no cards he asked them to 
learn from the database. She gave him the number, along with the expiration date.  
Table 23: Example of Young man on the run security risk 
Business asset Criminal characteristics, documents including a form with place 
for fingerprints 
IS asset Police department’s local expert, system that stores fingerprints 
Security Criterion Integrity of information stored in the system, confidentiality of 
information stored in the system 
Impact Police department's local expert is not trusted, negation of confi-
dentiality of private information as criminal characteristics, doc-
uments including a form with place for fingerprints 
Vulnerability Employee  of police department is not trusted 
Threat agent Caller who knows how to use phone system, get necessary phone 
number and gains a trust of employee 
Attack method Attacker called the patrol of state. A local expert answered to the 
phone. Frank asked a series of questions about what system they 
use, the possibilities of research, storage of fingerprints and 
received all necessary to him information. 
Security requirement Not provide private phone number 
Control Deploying countermeasures to protect the organization 
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Table 24. Example of gas attack security risk 
Business asset Address of the woman 
IS asset Employee of the organization 
Security Criterion Integrity and confidentiality of address or phone system of a per-
son 
Impact Negation of confidentiality of caller, employee is not trusted 
Vulnerability Employee of the organization is not trusted to verify the caller 
Threat agent Caller who knows how to use phone system, get necessary phone 
numbers 
Attack method Attacker performs one or two phone calls and receives address 
of the woman 
Security requirement Security training with respect to company policy designed to 
protect information assets needs to be for everyone in the com-
pany, not just any employee who has electronic or physical ac-
cess to the company’s IT assets. 
Control Deploying countermeasures to protect the organization 
 
Case: Doyle Lonnegan’s story 
Lonnegan - this is not the young man whom you would like to see when you open the front 
door. Former debt collector in gambling, he still does it sometimes. In this case, he was 
offered a large bag of cash in a few phone calls to the video store. Sounds simple enough. 
None of these "clients" did not know how to do the trick; They need someone with talent 
Loneganna. People do not write checks to cover their debts when they were unlucky or they 
foolishly playing poker. That man had no money, so they took the check. At $ 3,230. 
Naturally, he cheated. I do not close the door to the people who came to see me. In addition, 
currently there are better ways. I told them that my 30 percent commission, and I'll see what 
I can do. So they gave me his name, address, and I found in the computer next to him the 
video store. I'm not in a hurry. Four phone calls to the store manager, and then, bingo - I 
have a number of Visa card fraud.  
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Table 25. Example of first call-Andrea Lopez security risk 
Business asset Customer’s name and address, account number, manager’s 
name and postal address of the store, the number of the store 
IS asset Employes / Andrea & Ginny 
Security Criterion Integrity of account number of customer, confidentiality of ac-
count number of customer 
Impact Negation of authentication of the caller, Andrea & Ginny are not 
trusted 
Vulnerability Employees are not experienced to verify the caller 
Threat agent Caller who knows how to use phone system, get necessary 
phone numbers 
Attack method The one who called and said that he had left a very good impres-
sion of the video rental service, and he wanted to send a letter to 
the manager, and report it. He asked the manager's name and 
postal address, number of the store. All requested information 
was provided by an employee. Then attacker did second call to 
Ginny. The caller introduced himself Tomy Alison store man-
ager 863 in Forest Park. The reason for the call was a customer 
who wants to rent Rocky 5, but they do not have it in the store. 
She provided him with the necessary information. Three or four 
times over the next few weeks, Ginny received calls from 
Tommy to help in a particular case.  Once Tommy called and 
asked about problems with computers. Under this pretext 
Tommy gave the customer's name and address, and Ginny found 
it in the computer. She gave Tommy account number. Due to the 
fact that the client with him were no cards he asked them to learn 
from the database. She gave him the number, along with the ex-
piration date. 
Security requirement Security training with respect to company policy designed to 
protect information assets needs to be for everyone in the com-
pany, not just any employee who has electronic or physical ac-
cess to the company’s IT assets. 
Control Deploying countermeasures to protect the organization 
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Table 26. Example of Doyle Lonnegan’s Story security risk 
Business asset All information that attacker obtained in advance by calling to 
the store and gaining a trust of employee 
IS asset Employee 
Security Criterion Integrity to the valuable information 
Impact Required private information of the company received attacker 
Vulnerability Employee of the organization provided information as trusted to 
the attacker. 
Threat agent Required private information of the company received attacker 
Attack method Person called to the organization several times and obtained a 
trust as a colleague 
Security requirement Security training with respect to company policy designed to 
protect information assets needs to be for everyone in the com-
pany, not just any employee who has electronic or physical ac-
cess to the company's IT assets. 
Control Deploying countermeasures to protect the organization 
Case: Card Capture/Surprise for Daddy 
During the conversation, Henry blamed his father in the distribution of the number of his 
credit card as if it was his phone number. He pulled out his cell phone, he asked his father 
how he uses the branch and call the assistant director as well as on the number of stores in 
nearby Sherman Oaks. Then, using only a slight change in technique, he asked to read the 
account information: address, telephone number, and the date when the account was opened. 
In conversation, he also asked the credit card number and expiration of due date. When 
conversation was finished, he put a towel in front of his father, who has watched it with my 
mouth open. Mr. Conklin looked completely shocked, as if his confidence just collapsed.   
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Table 27. Example of card capture security risk 
Business asset Account information, address, telephone number, the date when 
the account was opened, credit card number and its expiration of 
due date. 
IS asset Database of the store, employee. 
Security Criterion Integrity of account information, integrity of address, integrity of 
telephone number, integrity of the credit card number and its ex-
piration of due date, confidentiality of account information, con-
fidentiality of address, confidentiality of telephone number, con-
fidentiality of the date when the account was opened, confiden-
tiality of credit card number and its expiration of due date. 
Impact Negation of authentication of caller, employee is not trusted. 
Vulnerability Employee is not experienced to verify the caller. 
Threat agent Caller: who knows how to use cell phone, how to get necessary 
phone number, who knows where potential victim uses his card. 
Attack method Henry blamed his father in the distribution of the number of his 
credit card as if it was his phone number. He pulled out his cell 
phone, he asked his father how he uses the branch and call the 
assistant director as well as on the number of stores in nearby 
Sherman Oaks. Then, using only a slight change in technique, he 
asked to read the account information: address, telephone num-
ber, and the date when the account was opened. In conversation, 
he also asked the credit card number and expiration of due date. 
When conversation was finished, he put a towel in front of his 
father, who has watched it with my mouth open. 
Security requirement Security training with respect to company policy designed to 
protect information assets need to be for everyone in the com-
pany, not just any employee who has electronic or physical ac-
cess to the company assets. 
Control Deploying countermeasures to protect the organization 
Case: The one-cent cell phone 
One social engineer in Philadelphia drew a cheap phone, cell phone company in the 
proposed contract, but he hated the tariff plans that were in the contract. First call: Ted. First, 
the social engineer calls in an electronics store in West Girard. Buyers who introduced a 
few days ago said the seller of cell phone, said he would call back. Call: Ketiyu next call  
the store of the same company on North Broad Street. Given that the attacker knew the name 
of the seller, he introduced this time colleague and asked to take a client's action "cell phone 
for one cent." When the guy who called himself Ted Janes, will be in stores on the street 
North Broad St. Katie billed and sold cell phone for one cent, as her colleague asked. She 
caught the trick cheater. When it came time to pay, the buyer did not have a penny in his 
pocket, so he got to the small plates with small change at the cash register, took one, and 
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gave the girl behind the register. He received a phone without paying a single cent for it. 
Now he can go to another company that uses the same standard telephones and ordered 
another tariff plan without any contractual obligations.   
Table 28. Example of the one cent cell phone security risk 
Business asset All information that attacked obtained in advance by calling to 
the store and gaining a trust of employee  
IS asset Employee 
Security Criterion Integrity to the valuable information 
Impact Required private information of the company received by at-
tacker 
Vulnerability Employee of the organization provided information as trusted to 
the attacker 
Threat agent A person who gains a trust of employee 
Attack method Employee treats as innocuous 
Security requirement Security training with respect to company policy designed to 
protect information assets needs to be for everyone in the com-
pany, not just any employee who has electronic or physical ac-
cess to the company's IT assets. 
Control Deploying countermeasures to protect the organization 
Case: Hacking into the Feds/ Tapping into the system 
Found a copy of the manual to gain access to the databases of the National Center of 
Information of crimes on the Internet. Later discovering really working guide NCIC, secret 
document, which allows to search for information from a national database FBI. Guide is a 
reference for the agencies of law enforcement agencies, which allows codes to search for 
information about criminals and crimes of the national database. Agencies across the 
country can find the same database for information to help in the fight against crime in their 
jurisdiction. The manual contains the codes used in the database starting with tattoos, ending 
marking the stolen money and commitment. Anyone with access to the leadership can find 
the syntax and commands to get the information from the national database. Then, follow 
the instructions from the manual, everyone can retrieve information from the database. 
Management also provides technical support telephone numbers in the system. You can 
have similar descriptions in your company offering product codes or codes for access to 
sensitive classified information. If the social engineer has such codes, that obtaining 
information for it  easy process. In this example, it could start to call the local police 
department employee and ask questions regarding one of the codes in the manual  for 
example, a code violation. He could, for example, saying "when I do a request to the NCIC, 
I get the error" System error ". You get the same thing as making a request? Could you try 
this for me? "Or it can be said that he tried to find a wpf  police jargon file on the wanted 
individuals. An employee at the other end of the phone learns by jargon that the caller is 
familiar with the procedures and query commands to the database NCIC. After the employee 
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confirms that the system works well. The attacker only has to look at the base of NCIC, to 
learn the meaning of numbers: what crimes committed people.   
Table 29. Example of hacking into the Feds security risk 
Business asset All information that attacker obtained in advance by a call 
IS asset Employee 
Security Criterion Integrity to the valuable information 
Impact Required private information of the company received attacker 
Vulnerability Employee of the organization provided information as trusted to 
the attacker 
Threat agent A person who gains a trust of employee 
Attack method Employee treats as innocuous 
Security requirement Employee needs to be trained to recognize social engineering 
scams 
Control Deploying countermeasures to protect the organization 
Case: The Network Outage 
Man of the breakdown called to the accounting department and was interested if they had a 
problem with the connection. Accountant politely replied that no, but the scammer gave his 
phone number on the special case. The last question asked as casually is to view the port 
number to which computer is connected. Second call: Man of maintenance. A few days later 
I received a call to the department LAN. Man of the technical department asked disable port 
647. Man of the workshop said that it would be done in a few minutes, and asked him to 
call back when the need to enable the port. Third call: Help from the enemy. About an hour 
later, a man who introduced himself as Eddie Martin, was shopping at Circuit City and 
suddenly the telephone rang. He looked up the caller's number, learned that he was from the 
shipbuilding company. He asked for help. The fourth call was 45 minutes later. All 
connection was ok but for this issue in the future, suggested a scammer program. Eddy told 
Him how to download a small application with a single site. Once the program is 
downloaded, Eddie said to run it by doubleclick. He tried it and it turned out that the program 
does not work, in response to the fraudster helped and told how to delete the program 
permanently. (With a running program, Bobby gets full control of the computer Tom called 
remote command line. When connected to a PC Bobby Tom, he was able to see all the 
accounting files that may be of interest, and copy them. Then, for fun, he checked files for 
information that will give customers what they are looking for).   
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Table 30. Example of the networkd outage security risk 
Business asset All information that attacker obtained in advance by a call 
IS asset Employee 
Security Criterion Integrity to the valuable information 
Impact Required private information of the company received attacker 
Vulnerability Employee of the organization helped to run al necessary actions 
as trusted to the attacker 
Threat agent A person who gains a trust of employee 
Attack method Employee treats as innocuous 
Security requirement Employees need to be trained to recognize social engineering 
scams. If a stranger does you a favor, then asks you for a favor, 
don't reciprocate without thinking carefully about what he's ask-
ing for. 
Control Deploying countermeasures to protect the organization 
Case: Craig Cogburne’s Story 
Craig Coborn was a salesman in a hightech company, and did his job very well. In search 
of work, he began to engage in industrial espionage. It was an urgent task. The client sent 
me a fax, a clipping from a medical journal, which said that GeminiMed working heart with 
fundamentally new structure, and it will be called STH100. Loud said this, some reporter 
has already done most of the work for me. He already had important information even before 
it started  the name of the new product. To get information about employees who worked 
on STH100 or need watching his schemes. Telephone operator called and said he did not 
remember his name, and his name starts with "C". She said there's Scott  
Archer and Sam Davidson. Then he asked next question is which of them is working on 
STH100. It turned out to Scott Archer. Caller introduced himself as Mike, from the mail 
department. They should get the parcel to a group of developers Artificial Heart STH100. 
He called me the name of the project manager, Jerry Mendel. I was even able to persuade 
him to see his room for me. Mendela was not there, but his answering machine said that he 
will be on vacation until the 13th, which meant that he had a whole week for skiing or 
anything else another, and in his absence can call Michelle on the phone 9137. The next call 
was introduced Michelle and Bill Thomas and called on Jerry. He began to ask and systems 
that they use and asked for an email list of people from the development team. The attacker 
wanted to get all the same fax, against what Michelle was not opposed. Secretary called and 
found room fax machine he got there the necessary documents. The receptionist kindly 
agreed to send data to another room, which an attacker sent to a company nearby. So had to 
talk to three or four different people in just a few hours, and already closer to the computers 
on a huge shag. First of all dialin number to the server from outside engineering. Called the 
GeminiMed again, and asked to be connected with the Department of IT, with someone who 
helps with the computer. phoned and found that they had set up a terminal server, which 
allows the caller to connect to any computer on their network. After heaps of attempts, I 
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came across someone's computer, where he was the guest account without having to enter a 
password. Some operating systems, when they are only installed, forcing the user to create 
a username and password, as well as provide a guest account. The user must supply your 
password on the guest account on or off it, but many do not even know about it or do not 
want anything to do. This system is most likely was just installed, and the owner did not 
even bother to disconnect the guest account. Thru guest account, I now have access to one 
computer, which was the old version of the operating system Unix. In Unix'e, the operating 
system contains a file which has encrypted passwords of everyone who has access to your 
computer. Password file contains oneway hash (ie, irreversible form of encryption) 
password of each user. With the hash, password, for example «justdoit» will be presented 
in an encrypted form; in this case, the hash will be converted to Unix in 13 
numericalalphabetical characters.   
Table 31. Example of Craig Cogrune’s story security risk 
Business asset All information that attacker obtained in advance by a call 
IS asset Employee 
Security Criterion Integrity to the valuable information 
Impact Required private information of the company received attacker 
Vulnerability Employee of the organization helped to obtain all necessary 
information as trusted to the attacker 
Threat agent A person who gains a trust of employee 
Attack method Employee treats as innocuous 
Security requirement Employees need to be trained to recognize social engineering 
scams. Keep sensitive information safe 
Control Deploying countermeasures to protect the organization 
Case: Keeping up with Joneses 
Sales and other units located throughout the world, coupled with the headquarters of the 
company through a global network (WAN). Cracker named Brian (Brian Atterby), knew 
that almost always easier to network in one of the remotest places where the security level 
should be lower than in the main office. Cracker called to the office in Chicago and asked 
to be connected with Mr. Jones. They turned 3 Johnson. Attacker got to the division where 
he asked the desired Port .When Jones picked up the phone, the attacker said that he was in 
the section on transfer of wages. Jones was distraught at the thought that his money could 
go to someone's account, he began to think that the guy on the other end should not have to 
hurry. Before the victim began talking attacker immediately asked best room, for allegedly 
help. Business trip. Afterwards called System Administrator Sales in Austin, Texas. The 
caller introduced himself from the department of business development  Joseph Jones. He 
needed access to email during business trip. Attacker carefully prepared and was ready to 
answer all the specific questions the system administrator.  
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Table 32. Example of Keeping up with Joneses security risk 
Business asset All information that attacker received to provide to the system 
administrator, port number 
IS asset Employee of the organization,  access of email, global network 
(WAN) 
Security Criterion Integrity of all information that attacker received to provide to 
the system administrator, confidentiality  of port number, 
confidentiality of all information that attacker received to 
provide to the system administrator 
Impact Negation of authentication of caller, employees in Chicago & 
Jones are not trusted 
Vulnerability Employees in Chicago, Jones & system administrator sales in 
Austin, Texas are not experienced to verify the caller 
Threat agent Caller (Brian): who knows how to use cell phone, knows 
weakness in global networks, knows devisions of the 
organization, knows how to get correct phone number. 
Attack method Cracker called to the office in Chicago and asked to be 
connected with Mr. Jones.Attacker got to the division where 
he asked the desired Port. Attacker immediately asked best 
room. Afterwards called System Administrator Sales in 
Austin, Texas. The caller introduced himself from the 
department of business development  Joseph Jones. He needed 
access to email during business trip. Attacker carefully 
prepared and was ready to answer all the specific questions the 
system administrator.  
Security requirement Employees need to be trained to recognize social engineering 
scams. Keep sensitive information safe. 
Control Deploying countermeasures to protect the organization. Every 
company needs a written, well-publised policy on disclosure of 
this type of information. 
Case: I saw it at the movies 
An example from the famous film that many people remember. In "Three days of the 
Condor" protagonist Turner (the role played by Robert Redford) is working with a small 
research firm under contract to the CIA. Once he returned from lunch and discovers that all 
his employees were shot. He had to find out who did it and why, knowing that at this time 
the bad guys are looking for him. Later he managed to find the phone number of one of the 
guys. But who he is and how to find it? He was lucky: screenwriter, David Ralph, 
fortunately, provided him with experience that includes training in the Signal Corps, which 
gives him an idea of the telephone companies. With the number of Man, Turner knows 
exactly what to do further. Terner, thanks to the experience lineman knows what number it 
is necessary to call the office of the company, which is called "Hour of names and 
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addresses." Customer names and addresses of subscribers is for the convenience of installers 
and other personnel of the company. The installer can call customer service and call the 
number. The clerk will report the name and address of the person who owns the phone.   
Table 33. Example of I saw it at the movies security risk 
Business asset Customer names and addresses. 
IS asset Clerk, The Singal Corps. 
Security Criterion Integrity of customer names and addresses, confidentiality of 
customer names and addresses, availability of customer names 
and addresses. 
Impact Negation of authentication of caller, clerk is not trusted. 
Vulnerability Lineman experience. 
Threat agent Caller: who has a lineman experience, knows how to use cell 
phone, knows how to get customer service number. 
Attack method Attacker knows what number it is necessary to call the office of 
the company, which is called "Hour of names and addresses." 
Thanks to received information caller contacts with  customer 
service and calls the number. The clerk will report the name and 
address of the person who owns the phone.  
Security requirement Employees need to be trained to recognize social engineering 
scams. Keep sensitive information safe. 
Control Deploying countermeasures to protect the organization. Every 
company needs a written, well-publised policy on disclosure of 
this type of information. 
Case: Danny the Eavesdropper 
Scanning enthusiast and skilled hackers who we'll call Danny decided to see if he could get 
the source code of a topsecret program interposer one of the leading manufacturers of secure 
radio systems. Danny wanted to examine the items carefully guarded company's product 
just to satisfy a burning curiosity and wonder clever innovations that could be implemented 
in the company. Danny began with careful preparation. Soon he gathered together enough 
information to impersonate this employee. He had a name, department, phone number, 
employee, and the name and telephone number of the head. Now it was the calm before the 
storm. On scheduling Danny needed was one more thing before you take the next step, and 
it was something he did not manage: he needed a blizzard. He needed help  from a nature in 
the form of weather, which would not allow workers to reach office. At the beginning of 
Friday night snowstorm. Snow quickly turned to hail, so that in the morning the roads were 
covered with ice. It was a great opportunity for Danny. He called on the plant, ask for the 
engine room and contacted the operator, who introduced himself as Roger Kowalski. Calling 
the name of the employee, Danny said that he was working in a group protected connections. 
Problem was that I need access to my computer and the server from home, and I left a secure 
ID in the table. Given that the operator she could Pokuna their workplace attacker asked to 
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borrow a secure ID, when he will need to enter the network. The operator was not ready to 
give access immediately. He called his boss and asked his permission. So on the weekend, 
every time Danny wanted to enter into a corporate network, he had only to call the computer 
center and ask to consider the six digits displayed safe ID. As Danny entered keywords 
"encrypted radio" and the name of the company, and found a message from a year ago an 
employee. It was placed, when the company began developing a product, perhaps long 
before the police authorities and federal authorities took control of the radio signals. 
Message containing a digital signature, which gives not only a person's name, Scott Press, 
but his phone number and even the name of the working group, the Group of secure 
communications. He introduced himself as an employee of IT department. Danny got the 
press to name the servers used for development. These servers can store source code 
containing proprietary encryption algorithm and the firmware used in the security product 
of company. On the rest of the weekend he could enter into the company’s network when 
he'd wanted to, thanks to the cooperation with the head of the computer center. He knew 
how to apply servers. But when he dialed the number, the terminal server, for which he 
came, he did not allow connection to the development of the Group's secure 
communications. It was an internal firewall or router, the protected computer systems group. 
We had to find another way to enter. The next step was the hold of an account on one of the 
computers to use Telnet to connect to my system. Head has approved the disclosure of 
access code displayed on synchronized tokens, so the new requirement does not seem 
excessive. Kowalski created a temporary account and password on one of the computers, 
the computing center and asked Danny "call when the account is no longer needed, so I 
deleted it." Going with a temporary account, Danny was able to connect over the network 
to the computer systems of the Group secure communications. After hours of searching 
vulnerabilities, which gave him access to the main server, he hit the jackpot. Obviously, the 
system administrator has followed the latest news about security bugs that allowed remote 
access. But Danny was well aware of this. In a short time he found the source files and send 
them to a site that provides free storage space. Here, even if the files have been found on his 
trail could never get out. Before leaving there was one final step: the systematic destruction 
of their tracks.  
Case: Phony sites and dangerous attachments 
Once you get a letter from a friend or business partner that contains the application. After 
all, cannot be something dangerous to come from someone you know, is not it? Especially 
if you know who to blame, if the information on your computer was damaged. You run the 
file and ... BOOM! Your computer has just been infected with a worm or a Trojan.   
Case: Merry Christmas 
Happy New Year ... A retired insurance salesman named Edgar received an email from 
PayPal, a company that provides a fast and convenient way of committing online shopping. 
This kind of service is very handy when a person from one part of the country (or the world) 
to buy anything from a person with whom he is not familiar. PayPal will charge the buyer's 
credit card and transfer money directly to the seller. As a collector of antique glass mugs, 
Edgar made many transactions through online auction eBay. He often used PayPal, 
sometimes several times a week. In general, Edgar was interested in receiving emails on 
weekends, 2001, which seemed to have been sent from someone on PayPal, offers him a 
reward for his PayPal account updates. He clicked on the link, fill out the information 
request  name, address, phone number, credit card information  and sat down to wait, when 
$ 5 will go to his account. But instead, began to appear on the list of expenditure items, that 
he never ordered.   
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Table 34. Example of Danny the Eavesdropper security risk 
Business asset Source code of a program, name, department, phone number, 
employee, and the name and telephone number of the head. 
IS asset Employee. 
Security Criterion Integrity and confidentiality of source code of a program, name, 
department, phone number, employee, and the name and 
telephone number of the head. 
Impact Employee is not trusted 
Vulnerability Employee is not experienced to verify the caller 
Threat agent Caller: how knows how to use cell phone, how to get some 
information in advance. 
Attack method Attacker obtained some information in advance. Snowy day 
allowed him to call to the targeted company and pretend that he 
is an employee. Problem was that  he need access to my computer 
and the server from home, and I left a secure ID in the table. After 
some talking with employees he got an access to the server. 
Finally he used his technical skills and got necessary information. 
Security requirement Employees need to be trained to recognize social engineering 
scams 
Control Deploying countermeasures to protect the organization 
 
Case: A visit to the Studio 
Talk a way into places that You would not have thought possible.First of all did some 
research , for a couple of days. Wrote down names, products, different studios from the 
information in magazines. Called to the Ron Hillyard’s office and told that he is  his 
colleague and came on board to work. He has a writer to come this evening and do not know 
how to receive an entrance. He doesn’t want to bother Biran’s office. Right touch to her and 
she helped with an information for a further research (by providing name and information 
of Security people). Victim himself gave a correct phone number and told whom to ask, so 
that person can help.  
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Table 35. Example of Phony sites and dangerous attachments security risk 
Business asset Letter from a friend or business partner. 
IS asset User, letter. 
Security Criterion Integrity of the letter from a friend or business partner, 
confidentiality of the letter from a friend or business partner, 
availability of the letter from a friend or business partner. 
Impact Letter from a friend or business partner is not trusted. 
Vulnerability User is not experienced to verify and identify vulnerable sender 
of the letter. 
Threat agent Sender of the letter: who knows how to gain trust of user, how to 
compose a letter, how to send  a letter, how to infect a letter with 
a worm or a Trojan. 
Attack method Attacker  send a letter from a friend or business partner that 
contains the application. You run the file and ... BOOM! Your 
computer has just been infected with a worm or a Trojan. 
Security requirement User needs to be trained to recognize social engineering scams 
Control Deploying countermeasures to protect the computer, inform the 
user not to open suspicious files 
 
Case: Do it now 
Linda moved out from a boyfriend. To revenge him she called him on least pleasant time 
which was around 11.00 on Saturday night, but he had changed his phone number. The new 
one was unlisted. As she worked before at the phone company she had an idea how to get a 
phone. From previous job left one repair ticket from one when there was a problem and 
printout listed the cable and pair for his phone.She still had the same pair of copper wires 
running from her house to the telephone company switching office. Knowing targeted cable 
& pair, the only thing that she wanted to find out the phone number.  Based on location and 
nearby COs and to force worker to quickly help based on emergency situation. Worker went 
to Webster CO, checked cables, and did line verification. What Linda wanted to get the 
phone number.  
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Table 36 Example of Merry Christmas security risk 
Business asset Information about name, address, phone number, credit card in-
formation. 
IS asset Edgar, PayPal system. 
Security Criterion Integrity of information about name, address, phone number, 
credit card information; confidentiality of information  about 
name, address, phone number, credit card information; availabil-
ity of information about name, address, phone number, credit 
card information. 
Impact Email from the PayPal is not trusted, negation of authentication 
of received email. 
Vulnerability User is not experienced to verify the email. 
Threat agent Attacker who knows how to send fake emails from PayPal. 
Attack method User received an emails, which seemed to have been sent from 
someone on PayPal, offers him a reward for his PayPal account 
updates. He clicked on the link, fill out the information request  
name, address, phone number, credit card information  and sat 
down to wait, when $ 5 will go to his account. But instead, began 
to appear on the list of expenditure items that he never ordered. 
Security requirement User needs to be trained to recognize social engineering scams 
Control Deploying countermeasures to protect the computer, inform the 
user not to open suspicious files 
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Table 37. Example of A visit to the Studio security risk 
Business asset Correct phone number and information whom to ask. 
IS asset Employee. 
Security Criterion Integrity of correct phone number, confidentiality of correct phone 
number. 
Impact Employee is not trusted, negation of authentication of caller. 
Vulnerability Employee is not experienced to verify the caller. 
Threat agent Caller: who knows how to use phone system, how to do some 
research. 
Attack method Caller called to the office and told that he needs an invitation to this 
evening. He doesn’t want to bother Biran’s office. Right touch to 
employee and she gave a correct phone number and told whom to 
ask, so that person can help. 
Security require-
ment 
To verify that the person really works there. 
Control Your employees are truly conscientious about stopping anyone with 
or without a visitor's badge who is on his own, and questioning him. 
If the answers aren't satisfactory, your employees have to be willing 
to contact security.  
Case: Mr. Bigg wants it 
Name dropping. Attacker played on urgency and told that they haven’t received report from 
them (whom called). They need it immediately as tomorrow they have to present their work. 
They will have to work all night in order to meet deadline. Pushed to the person who 
responded a call because he is on a lower level in the company.  
  
76 
 
Table 38. Example of Do it now security risk 
Business asset Repair ticket, printout listed the cable and pair for his phone. 
IS asset Employee. 
Security Criterion Integrity of repair ticket, integrity of listed the cable and pair for 
this phone, availability of repair ticket, availability of listed the 
cable and pair for his phone. 
Impact Negation of authentication of caller, employee is not trusted. 
Vulnerability Employee of the organization is not experienced to verify the caller. 
Threat agent Caller: who worked before at the phone company and has an idea 
how to get a phone; has left one repair ticket, printout listed the 
cable and pair for his phone. 
Attack method Attacker still had the same pair of copper wires running from her 
house to the telephone company switching office. Knowing 
targeted cable & pair, the only thing that she wanted to find out the 
phone number.  Based on location and nearby COs and to force 
worker to quickly help based on emergency situation. Worker went 
to Webster CO, checked cables, and did line verification. 
Security require-
ment 
Companies need to prepare for social engineering attacks from 
current or former employees who may have an axe to grind. 
Background checks may be helpful to weed out prospects who may 
have a propensity toward this type of behavior. But in most cases, 
these people will be extremely difficult to detect. The only 
reasonable safeguard in these cases is to enforce and audit 
procedures for verifying identity, including the person's 
employment status, prior to disclosing any information to anyone 
not personally known to still be with the company.  
Control Deploying countermeasures to protect the organization 
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Table 39. Example of Mr Bigg wants it security risk 
Business asset Report. 
IS asset Employee. 
Security Criterion Integrity of report, availability of report, confidentiality of 
report. 
Impact Negation of authentication of caller, employee is not trusted. 
Vulnerability Employee is not experienced to verify the caller. 
Threat agent A caller: who knows how to use a cell phone, how to get a 
correct phone number, knows the structure of the organization. 
Attack method Attacker played on urgency and told that they haven’t received 
report from them (whom called). They need it immediately as 
tomorrow they have to present their work. They will have to 
work all night in order to meet deadline. Pushed to the person 
who responded a call because he is on a lower level in the 
company. 
Security requirement People must be trained that it's not only acceptable but expected 
to challenge authority when security is at stake. Information 
security training should include teaching people how to 
challenge authority in customer-friendly ways, without 
damaging relationships. Moreover, this expectation must be 
supported from the top down. If an employee is not going to be 
backed up for challenging people regardless of their status, the 
normal reaction is to stop challenging--just the opposite of what 
you want.  
Control Deploying countermeasures to protect the organization 
Case: What the social security administration knows about you 
Accountant Mary Harris received a phone call from a company who does tech support to 
her firm. Based on the callers information many people in the office troubleshoot, so he 
wants to run couple of tests with her. She had to log into her computer and tell him, what 
she was typing.  She told her ID, password. “Tech support“told that it is her private info and 
she doesn’t have to tell it anybody. He on his screen will see just asterisks. She can let him 
know when computer will start up. He installed update to change her password and asked 
her to use that tool. For the first password he asked to use “test123”. He worked through 
again of disconnecting from the server, then again connected (with a new password). 
Afterward they changed to original one. He was very pleased and she thanked him. (He 
installed a program that allows him to access the company’s computer system whenever he 
wanted, by using his own password). The aim of this trick is to receive an access to other 
contracts and to help Alice. She wanted to receive a job in that company but wasn’t sure 
that conditions are good (comparing with others).  
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Table 40. Example of what the social security administration knows about you security risk 
Business asset ID, password. 
IS asset Accountant (Mary Harris), server. 
Security Criterion Integrity of ID, integrity of password, confidentiality of ID, 
confidentiality of password. 
Impact Negation of authentication of caller, accountant is not trusted. 
Vulnerability Accountant is not experienced to verify the caller. 
Threat agent Caller: who knows how to use cell phone, how to get correct 
phone number, how to install update, how to disconnect and 
connect to server. 
Attack method Accountant Mary Harris received a phone call from a company 
who does tech support to her firm. Based on the callers 
information many people in the office troubleshoot, so he wants 
to run couple of tests with her. She had to log into her computer 
and tell him, what she was typing. He installed update to change 
her password and asked her to use that tool. For the first 
password he asked to use “test123”. He worked through again of 
disconnecting from the server, then again connected (with a new 
password). Afterward they changed to original one.  
Security requirement Employees need to be trained to recognize social engineering 
scams. The premise is to trigger an automatic response based on 
psychological principles, and rely on the mental shortcuts people 
take when they perceive the caller as an ally. 
Control Deploying countermeasures to protect the organization 
Case: The police raid 
The government has been trying to lay a trap for a man named Arturo Sanchez, who has 
been distributing movies free over the Internet. The Hollywood studios say he's violating 
their copyrights, he says he's just trying to nudge them to recognize an inevitable market. 
Arturo came home late one night and learned that there was indeed a police raid in the 
building. He checks his apartment. The bad news is that there's a paper from the police 
requiring that he call immediately and set up an appointment for an interview within three 
days. The worse news is that his computers are missing. Arturo satisfied his need to know 
like this: To start with, he got the phone number for a nearby copy store, called them, and 
asked for their fax number. Then he called the district attorney's office, and asked for 
Records. When he was connected with the records office, he introduced himself as an 
investigator with Lake County, and said he needed to speak with the clerk who files the 
active search warrants. After a small talk he asked a clerk to fax all documents on this case. 
As on the police office they didn’t have a fax machine, she was ready to help and from 
Clerk’s office to send fax.  In Clerk’s office lady asked who will pay to this service.  She 
needed accounting code. To receive it he called to the DA’s office and asked receptions. 
She gave him account code without hesitation. The he called back to the Clerk’s office and 
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provided accounting number. That also gave a good excuse to manipulate the lady in the 
further. After several calls to the store, he finally received documents. Then he called to the 
Clerk’s office and told that they can throw them away. They are not necessary anymore. By 
obtaining all info he knew that police is after him and crossed the state line.  
Table 41. Example of the police raid security risk 
Business asset Movies, documents of his case. 
IS asset Clerk’s office, fax number, district attorney’s office,records 
office, accounting number. 
Security Criterion Integrity of movies, confidentiality of movies, integrity of 
documents of his case, confidentiality of documents of his case. 
Impact Negation of authentication of caller, Clerk’s office is not trusted, 
district attorney’s office is not trusted, records office is not 
trusted.  
Vulnerability Clerk's office, district attorney’s office & records office 
employee is not experienced to verify the caller. 
Threat agent Caller: who knows how to use cell phone, how to get correct 
phone number. 
Attack method Attacker got the phone number for a nearby copy store, called 
them, and asked for their fax number. Then he called the district 
attorney's office, and asked for Records. When he was connected 
with the records office, he introduced himself as an investigator 
with Lake County, and said he needed to speak with the clerk 
who files the active search warrants. After a small talk he asked 
a clerk to fax all documents on this case. As on the police office 
they didn’t have a fax machine, she was ready to help and from 
Clerk’s office to send fax.  In Clerk’s office lady asked who will 
pay to this service.  She needed accounting code. To receive it 
he called to the DA’s office and asked receptions. She gave him 
account code without hesitation. The he called back to the 
Clerk’s office and provided accounting number. That also gave 
a good excuse to manipulate the lady in the further. After several 
calls to the store, he finally received documents. Then he called 
to the Clerk’s office and told that they can throw them away. 
They are not necessary anymore. By obtaining all info he knew 
that police is after him and crossed the state line. 
Security requirement Employees need to be trained and to pay attention on daily 
decisions when providing information. 
Control Deploying countermeasures to protect the organization 
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Case: The art of friendly persuasion 
Vince Cappelis has received a task to received information about Joe Markowitz’s bank 
account savings / situation. First of all he needed branch number of that department. One 
call and information obtained right from the bank.  Second step, call to Angela and knows 
that she leaves at 12:30 to lunch.  Third one is to Louis Halpburn. Attacker introduced 
himself as Neil Wenster from department 3182, who wants to talk with Angela. He needs 
to send information about a client urgently, so as verification & safety measures asks to 
B(be) no, not E . That way he received 2 codes. Next call is to Walter. He asks to give code 
C, but attacker found an excuse and asks to request code B or E. After some time attacker 
received fax with sig card.One more call gave me the 800 number that customers use for the 
automated service where an electronic voice reads you off the information you ask for. From 
the sig card, he had all of target's account numbers and his PIN number, because that bank 
used the first five or last four digits of the social security number. Pen in hand, he called the 
800 number and after a few minutes of pushing buttons, he had the latest balance in all four 
of the guy's accounts, and just for good measure, his most recent deposits and withdrawals 
in each.   
Case: Cops as Dupes 
One particular social engineer--Eric Mantini. Eric figured it was unnecessarily increasing 
his risk to call the Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) and go through the same ruse time 
after time whenever he needed that information. He wondered whether there wasn't some 
way to simplify the process. He did it by taking advantage of a service provided by his state's 
Department of Motor Vehicles. Many state DMVs (or whatever the department may be 
called in your state) make otherwise-privileged information about citizens available to 
insurance firms, private investigators, and certain other groups that the state legislature has 
deemed entitled to share it for the good of commerce and the society at large. In the state 
Eric then lived in, the required identification was a Requestor Code issued by the DMV, 
along with the officer's driver's license number. He wanted to pretend as a cop, so he started 
to investigate and get as much information as possible. First call: asked for the phone 
number of DMV headquarters in the state capitol. He then called a nearby sheriff's station 
and asked for Teletype--the office where communications are sent to and received from 
other law enforcement agencies, the national crime database, local warrants, and so forth. 
When he reached Teletype, he said he was looking for the phone number for law 
enforcement to use when calling the DMV state headquarters. So Eric now had the special 
phone number for law enforcement officers to call the DMV. He called the state 
Telecommunications Department and claimed he was from Nortel, the manufacturer of the 
DMS-100, one of the most widely used commercial telephone switches.To defend against 
outside intruders, commercial switches of this type are password-protected, just like every 
corporate computer network. Any good social engineer with a phonephreaking background 
knows that Nortel switches provide a default account name for software updates: NTAS (the 
abbreviation for Nortel Technical Assistance Support; not very subtle).  He found out a 
password and got an access to the line as an automated user. He picked line number eighteen 
in the sequence, and entered the code that added call. When copes forwarding to that line. 
For the call-forwarding number, he entered the phone number of his new, cheap, prepaid 
cell phone. That way he started to collect all information from cops. After taking calls for a 
few hours and obtaining dozens of requestor codes, Eric dialed into the switch and 
deactivated the call forwarding.   
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Table 42. Example of the art of fiendly persuasion security risk 
Business asset Branch number, codes, sig card, account number, pin number, 
social security number. 
IS asset Employee, bank account’s information. 
Security Criterion Integrity of branch number, integrity of codes, integrity of sig 
card, integrity of account number, integrity of pin number, 
integrity of social security number, confidentiality of branch 
number, confidentiality of codes, confidentiality of sig card, 
confidentiality of account number, confidentiality of pin number, 
confidentiality of social security number. 
Impact Negation of authentication of caller, employee is not trusted. 
Vulnerability Employee is not experienced to verify the caller. 
Threat agent Caller knows how to use cell phone, how to get correct phone 
number, know the structure and process in bank. 
Attack method First of all he needed branch number of that department. One call 
and information obtained right from the bank.  Second step, call 
to Angela and knows that she leaves at 12:30 to lunch.  Third one 
is to Louis Halpburn. Attacker introduced himself as Neil 
Wenster from department 3182, who wants to talk with Angela. 
He needs to send information about a client urgently, so as 
verification & safety measures asks to B(be) no, not E . That way 
he received 2 codes. Next call is to Walter. He asks to give code 
C, but attacker found an excuse and asks to request code B or E. 
After some time attacker received fax with sig card.One more call 
gave me the 800 number that customers use for the automated 
service where an electronic voice reads you off the information 
you ask for. From the sig card, he had all of target's account 
numbers and his PIN number, because that bank used the first five 
or last four digits of the social security number. Pen in hand, he 
called the 800 number and after a few minutes of pushing buttons, 
he had the latest balance in all four of the guy's accounts, and just 
for good measure, his most recent deposits and withdrawals in 
each. 
Security requirement Make some kind of validation technique before providing 
valuable information 
Control Properly trained, the character in the first story in this chapter 
would not have had to rely on his instincts, easily overcome, when 
asked to give a security code to a stranger. Verbal security codes 
are equivalent to passwords in providing a convenient and reliable 
means of protecting data. But employees need to be 
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knowledgeable about the tricks that social engineers use, and 
trained not to give up the keys to the kingdom.  
 
Case: Hacking behind bars 
One of the grifters, Charles Gondorff was tossed into a correctional center near San Diego. 
His pal Johnny Hooker knew that Charlie was going to need a defense attorney. The money 
for a good lawyer would have to come from running another scam. He'd wanted to get in 
touch with Gondorff anyway. After a couple of tossing-and-turning nights brainstorming a 
plan, Johnny woke up one mormng with the whole thing laid out in his mind, in five steps. 
First, he'd find out the phone numbers for those ten direct-connect telephones to the PDO. 
He'd have all ten changed so that the phones would allow incoming calls. He'd find out 
which housing unit Gondorff was on. Then he'd find out which phone number went to that 
unit. Finally, he'd arrange with Gondorff when to expect his call, without the government 
suspecting a thing.   
Case: The speedy download 
Ned Racien owned his business. One of his clients was very successful accounting firm that 
specialized in mergers and acquisitions. They hadn't used Ned for long, just long enough for 
him to realize they were involved in deals that, once they hit the newspapers, would affect 
the stock price of one or two publicly traded companies. He knew a man, who knew a man, 
who was wise about things not exactly in the mainstream. The man listened to the plan, got 
fired up and agreed to help. For a smaller fee than he usually charged, against a percentage 
of Ned's stock market killing, the man gave Ned instructions on what to do. He also gave 
him a handy little device to use, something brand-new on the market. For a few days in a 
row Ned kept watch on the parking lot of the small business park, where the accounting 
company had its unpretentious, storefront-like offices. Most people left between 5:30 and 
6. By 7, the lot was empty. The cleaning crew showed up around 7:30. Perfect. On one of 
the evenings, he knocked to the door and showed in the office as a worker. The man 
unlocked the door, locked it again behind Ned, and then went down the corridor turning on 
lights, so Ned could see, where he was going. And why not--he was being kind to one of the 
people who helped put food on his table. Or so he had every reason to think.   
Case: Easy Money 
Author (attacker) distracted the woman, chatting her up. Meanwhile Vinny, out of her sight 
line, had gone to work.  
Vinny, squatting down at the back of the booth, so he couldn't be seen, picked the lock on 
the cabinet that housed their PDP-11 minicomputer and the cable terminations. Vinny 
plugged the cable leading from the console port into one of the terminals on the show floor. 
Because the LOCK-11 software now identified that attacker was logging in from an 
authorized terminal, it granted me access, and attacker was connected with system 
administrator privileges. Attacker patched the operating system by changing it, so that from 
any of the terminals on the floor, I would be able to log in as a privileged user. Attacker did 
a directory listing, to find out what files were on the computer, looking for the LocK-11 
program and associated files and stumbled on something attacker found shocking: a 
directory that should not have been on this machine. The developers had been so 
overconfident, so certain their software was invincible, that they hadn't bothered to remove 
the source code of their new product. Moving to the adjacent hard-copy terminal, attacker  
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Table 43. Example of cops aa dupes security risk 
Business asset Requestor code, driver’s license number, phone number of DMV, 
account name, password, special phone number for law 
enforcement officers. 
IS asset Employees, DMV, DMS-100 
Security Criterion Confidentiality of requestor’s code, confidentiality of driver’s 
license number, confidentiality of phone number of DMV, 
confidentiality of account name, confidentiality of password, 
confidentiality of special phone number of law enforcement 
officers. 
Impact Negation of authentication of caller, employee is not trusted. 
Vulnerability Employee is not experienced to verify the caller. 
Threat agent Caller knows how to use cell phone, how to get necessary phone 
number, knows about telephone switches. 
Attack method First call: asked for the phone number of DMV headquarters in the 
state capitol. He then called a nearby sheriff's station and asked for 
Teletype--the office where communications are sent to and received 
from other law enforcement agencies, the national crime database, 
local warrants, and so forth. When he reached Teletype, he said he 
was looking for the phone number for law enforcement to use when 
calling the DMV state headquarters. So Eric now had the special 
phone number for law enforcement officers to call the DMV. He 
called the state  
Telecommunications Department and claimed he was from Nortel, 
the manufacturer of the DMS-100, one of the most widely used 
commercial telephone switches.To defend against outside intruders, 
commercial switches of this type are password-protected, just like 
every corporate computer network. Any good social engineer with 
a phone-phreaking background knows that Nortel switches provide 
a default account name for software updates: NTAS (the 
abbreviation for Nortel Technical Assistance Support; not very 
subtle).  He found out a password and got an access to the line as 
an automated user. He picked line number eighteen in the sequence, 
and entered the code that added call. When copes forwarding to that 
line. For the callforwarding number, he entered the phone number 
of his new, cheap, prepaid cell phone. That way he started to collect 
all information from cops. After taking calls for a few hours and 
obtaining dozens of requestor codes, Eric dialed into the switch and 
deactivated the call forwarding. 
Control At the very least, the employee should record the caller's name, 
phone number, and office or department, and then hang up. Before 
calling back he should verify that the organization really does have 
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an employee of that name, and that the call back phone number 
matches the phone number in the on-line or hard-copy company 
directory.  
Table 44.Example of hacking behind bars security risk 
Business asset Phone numbers of the necessary unit, number for the RCMAC 
IS asset PDO, employee of correctional center 
Security Crite-
rion 
Confidentiality of phone numbers of the necessary unit, 
confidentiality of number for the RCMAC, integrity of phone 
numbers of the necessary unit, integrity of number for the RCMAC. 
Impact Employee is not trusted, negation of authentication of caller. 
Vulnerability Employee is not experienced to verify the caller. 
Threat agent Caller, who knows how to use cell phone, how to get correct phone 
number, knows how to change the phone system. 
Attack method First, attack fond out the phone numbers for those ten direct-connect 
telephones to the PDO. He'd have all ten changed so that the phones 
would allow incoming calls. He'd found out which housing unit 
Gondorff was on. Then he'd found out which phone number went to 
that unit. Finally, he'd arranged with Gondorff when to expect his call, 
without the government suspecting a thing.  
Control At the very least, the employee should record the caller's name, phone 
number, and office or department, and then hang up. Before calling 
back he should verify that the organization really does have an 
employee of that name, and that the call back phone number matches 
the phone number in the on-line or hard-copy company directory.  
 
started printing out portions of the source code onto the continuous sheets of the green-
striped computer paper used in those days.   
Case: The misleading caller ID 
Linda Hill's phone rang just as she was in the middle of writing a memo to her boss. She 
glanced at her caller ID, which showed that the call was from the corporate office in New 
York, but from someone named Victor Martin--not a name she recognized. She picked up 
the phone and the caller introduced himself and said he was from PR, and working on some 
material for the CEO. He needs the top-line financials for the current quarter & his financial 
projections on the Apache project. She sent the fax a few minutes later. But Victor did not 
work for the PR department. In fact, he didn't even work for the company.  
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Table 45. Example of speedy download security risk 
Business asset Login, password, USB  
IS asset Database of the accounting company, employee 
Security Crite-
rion 
Confidentiality of login, confidentiality of password, integrity of USB. 
Impact Employee is not trusted, negation of authentication of an entering 
person. 
Vulnerability Employee is not experienced to verify an entering person. 
Threat agent Person who entreated to the building, who knows companies 
timetable. 
Attack method For a few days in a row Ned kept watch on the parking lot of the small 
business park, where the accounting company had its unpretentious, 
storefront-like offices. Most people left between 5:30 and 6. By 7, the 
lot was empty. The cleaning crew showed up around 7:30. Perfect. On 
one of the evenings, he knocked to the door and showed in the office 
as a worker. The man unlocked the door, locked it again behind Ned, 
and then went down the corridor turning on lights, so Ned could see, 
where he was going. 
Control Deploying countermeasures to protect the organization 
Case: The president of the United States is calling 
As co-host of a radio show in Los Angeles called "Dark side of the Internet" on KFI Talk 
Radio, I worked under the station's program director. David, one of the most committed and 
hardworking people I've ever met, is very difficult to reach by telephone because he's so 
busy. He's one of those people who doesn't answer a call unless he sees from the caller ID 
that it's someone he needs to talk to. I talked over what to do about this with a long-time 
friend, who is the cofounder of a real estate firm that provides office space for high-tech 
companies. Together we came up with a plan. He had access to his company's Meridian 
telephone switch, which gives him the ability to program the calling party number, as 
described in the previous story. Whenever I needed to reach the program director and 
couldn't get a call through, I would ask my friend to program any number of my choosing 
to appear on the caller ID. Sometimes I'd have him make the call look as if it was coming 
from David's office assistant, or sometimes from the holding company that owns the station. 
But my favorite was programming the call to appear from David's own home telephone 
number, which he always picked up. H1 give the guy credit, though. He always had a good 
sense of humor about it when he'd pick up the phone and discover I had fooled him once 
again.   
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Table 46.Example of Easy money security risk 
Business asset Console port, terminal, LOCK-11 software, source code. 
IS asset Woman ( employee), show floor 
Security Crite-
rion 
Integrity of console port, integrity of terminal, confidentiality of 
LOCK-11 software, integrity of LOCK-11 software, confidentiality 
of source code. 
Impact Woman is not trusted. 
Vulnerability Employee is not experienced. 
Threat agent Attackers: one of which distracted the woman, second one has 
technical skills. 
Attack method Author (attacker) distracted the woman, chatting her up. Meanwhile 
Vinny, out of her sight line, had gone to work. Vinny, squatting down 
at the back of the booth, so he couldn't be seen, picked the lock on the 
cabinet that housed their PDP-11 minicomputer and the cable 
terminations. Vinny plugged the cable leading from the console port 
into one of the terminals on the show floor. Because the LOCK-11 
software now identified that attacker was logging in from an 
authorized terminal, it granted me access, and attacker was connected 
with system administrator privileges. Attacker patched the operating 
system by changing it, so that from any of the terminals on the floor, 
I would be able to log in as a privileged user. Attacker did a directory 
listing, to find out what files were on the computer, looking for the 
LocK-11 program and associated files and stumbled on something 
attacker found shocking: a directory that should not have been on this 
machine. The developers had been so overconfident, so certain their 
software was invincible, that they hadn't bothered to remove the 
source code of their new product. Moving to the adjacent hard-copy 
terminal, attacker started printing out portions of the source code onto 
the continuous sheets of the green striped computer paper used in 
those days.  
Control Deploying all possible countermeasures to protect the software 
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Table 47. Example of the misleading caller ID security risk 
Business asset Financials for the current quarter, financial projections on the 
Apache project 
IS asset Employee 
Security Criterion confidentiality of financials for the current quester, confidentiality 
of financial projections on the Apache project 
Impact Employee is not trusted, negation of authentication of caller. 
Vulnerability Employee is not experienced to verify the caller. 
Threat agent Caller who has knowledge in telecommunication, has knowledge in 
the current process of the organization. 
Attack method Attacker caller and introduced himself as Victor Martin (made 
corresponding ID). He said that was from PR and working on some 
material for the CEO. He needs the top-line financials for the current 
quarter & his financial projections on the Apache project. She sent 
the fax a few minutes later. But Victor did not work for the PR 
department. In fact, he didn't even work for the company. 
Control Organization has to deploy all possible countermeasures of 
protection.  
Table 48. Example of the president of the United States is calling security risk 
Business asset Caller ID 
IS asset company’s Meridian telephone switch 
Security Criterion Integrity of caller ID, confidentiality of caller ID 
Impact Negation of access to the company’s meridian telephone switch 
Vulnerability Company's meridian telephone switch is accessible to third party 
Threat agent Attacker: who has an access to company’s Meridian telephone 
switch and programming skills 
Attack method Attacker had access to the company's Meridian telephone switch, 
which gives him the ability to program the calling party number, 
as described in the previous story. Whenever he needed to reach 
the program director and couldn't get a call through, he would ask 
a friend to program any number of my choosing to appear on the 
caller ID. 
Control Organization has to deploy all possible countermeasures of 
protection.  
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Case: The invisible employee 
Shirley Cutlass has found a new and exciting way to make fast money. Today she has set 
her sights on getting confidential information from the customer service department of a 
credit card company. After doing the usual kind of homework, she calls the target company 
and tells the switchboard operator who answers that she'd like to be connected to the 
Telecom Department. Reaching Telecom, she asks for the voice mail administrator. Using 
information gathered from her research, she explains that her name is Norma Todd from the 
Cleveland office. Using a ruse that should by now be familiar to you, she says she'll be 
traveling to corporate headquarters for a week, and she'll need a voice mailbox there so she 
won't have to make long distance calls to check her voice mail messages. No need for a 
physical telephone connection, she says, just a voice mailbox. He says he'll take care of it, 
he'll call her back when it's set up to give her the information she'll need. Shirley phones in, 
changes the password, and records her new outgoing greeting. She calls the customer service 
department of the company. And she goes on to provide the name and date of birth of the 
person whose identity she is intent on stealing. Then she lists the information she wants: 
address, mother's maiden name, card number, credit limit, available credit, and payment 
history. She keeps busy with errands for the rest of the morning, and then checks her voice 
mail that afternoon. It's all there, everything she asked for. Before hanging up, Shirley clears 
the outgoing message; it would be careless to leave a recording of her voice behind.   
Case: The helpful secretary 
Cracker Robert Jorday had been regularly breaking into the computer networks of a global 
company, Rudolfo  
Shipping, Inc. The company eventually recognized that someone was hacking into their 
terminal server, an, that through that server the user could connect to any computer system 
at the company. To safeguard the corporate network, the company decide, to require a dial-
up password on every terminal server.Robert called the Network Operations Center posing 
as an attorney with the Legal Department and said he was having trouble connecting to the 
network. The network administrator he reached explained that there had been some recent 
security issues, so all dial-up access users would need to obtain the monthly password from 
their manager. Robert wondered what method was being used to communicate each month's 
password to the managers and how he could obtain it. The answer, it turned out, was that 
the password for the upcoming month was sent in a memo via office, mail to each company 
manager. That made things easy. Robert did a little research, called the company just after 
the first of the month, and reached the secretary of one manager who gave her name as Janet.  
He asked her to send this passwords by fax as he lost that paper somewhere. He gave the 
receptionist a fax number that went to an on-line fax service. When this service receives a 
fax, the automated system sends it to the subscriber's email address.   
Case: The Traffic Court 
The traffic violater was Paul Durea. First call was done to Subphoena Control. Attacker 
wanted to know when Officer Kendall will not be available. He received all necessary 
information. Second call to the Municipal Court, to schedule a court date. Next action was 
a meeting in the Municap court, where violator didn’t want to attend traffic school and asked 
to set for trial. Also violator told that he will have a business trip and informed the court 
when he will be available.  On next meeting Paul arrived at court early on the 8th. When the 
judge came in, the clerk gave him a list of the cases for which the officers had not appeared. 
The judge called the defendants, including Paul, and told them their cases were dismissed. 
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Table 49. Example of the invisible employee security risk 
Business asset Voice mailbox, name, date of birth of the person whose identity, 
address, mother's maiden name, card number, credit limit, available 
credit, and payment history. 
IS asset Switchboard operator, telecom 
Security Criterion Availability of voice mailbox, name, date of birth of the person 
whose identity, address, mother's maiden name, card number, credit 
limit, available credit, and payment history; confidentiality of voice 
mailbox, name, date of birth of the person whose identity, address, 
mother's maiden name, card number, credit limit, available credit, 
and payment history. 
Impact Switchboard operator is not trusted, negation of authentication of 
caller. 
Vulnerability Switchboard operator is not experienced to verify the caller. 
Threat agent Caller: who knows how to use cell phone, gather some information 
in advance. 
Attack method Attacker calls the target company and tells the switchboard operator 
who answers that she'd like to be connected to the Telecom 
Department. Reaching Telecom, she asks for the voice mail 
administrator. Using information gathered from her research, she 
explains that her name is Norma Todd from the Cleveland office. No 
need for a physical telephone connection, she says, just a voice 
mailbox. And she goes on to provide the name and date of birth of 
the person whose identity she is intent on stealing.  
Control Try calling your own voice mail once in a while; if you hear an 
outgoing message that's not yours, you may have just encountered 
your first social engineer.  
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Table 50. Example of the helpful secretary security risk 
Business asset Dial-up password, terminal server. 
IS asset Network Operations Center, secretary. 
Security Criterion Confidentiality of dial-up password, terminal server; integrity of 
dial-up password, terminal server; availability of dial-up password, 
terminal server. 
Impact Secretary is not trusted, negation of authentication of a caller. 
Vulnerability Secretary is not experienced to verify the caller. 
Threat agent Caller: who knows how to use cell phone, how to get correct phone 
number. 
Attack method Attacker wondered what method was being used to communicate 
each month's password to the managers and how he could obtain it. 
The answer, it turned out, was that the password for the upcoming 
month was sent in a memo via office, mail to each company 
manager. That made things easy. Robert did a little research, called 
the company just after the first of the month, and reached the 
secretary of one manager who gave her name as Janet.  He asked her 
to send this passwords by fax as he lost that paper somewhere. He 
gave the receptionist a fax number that went to an on-line fax service. 
When this service receives a fax, the automated system sends it to 
the subscriber's email address.  
Control Organization has to deploy all possible countermeasures of 
protection.  
  
91 
 
Table 51. Example of traffic court security risk 
Business asset Serial number of officer 
IS asset Employee of Municipal Court, Subpoena Control. 
Security Criterion Availability of serial number of officer, confidentiality of serial 
number of officer. 
Impact Negation of authentication of a caller, employee is not trusted. 
Vulnerability Employee is not experienced to verify the caller. 
Threat agent Caller: who knows how to use cell phone, how to get necessary 
phone number. 
Attack method First call was done to Subphoena Control. Attacker wanted to know 
when officer Kendall will not be available. He received all necessary 
information. Second call to the Municipal Court, to schedule a court 
date. Next action was a meeting in the Municap court, where violator 
didn’t want to attend traffic school and asked to set for trial. On next 
meeting Paul arrived at court early on the 8th. When the judge came 
in, the clerk gave him a list of the cases for which the officers had 
not appeared. The judge called the defendants, including Paul, and 
told them their cases were dismissed. 
Control Law enforcement agencies have to inform their workers about 
possibility of attack and steal of information. 
Case: Samantha’s revenge 
Samantha Gregson was angry. She hasn’t received promotion and decided to revenge the 
company. She had been in young Mr. Johannson's office one day shortly after that when he 
logged onto the corporate network. Without thinking, she had watched his fingers (shoulder 
surfing, this is sometimes called). He had entered "marty63" as his password. Her plan was 
beginning to come together. There was a memo, she remembered typing not long, after she 
came to the company. She found a copy in the files and typed up a new version, using 
language from the original one. When most everybody was gone at lunch, she cut Mr. 
Cartright's signature from the original memo, pasted it onto her new version, and daubed 
Wite-Out around the edges. She made a copy of the result, and then made a copy of the 
copy. You could barely see the edges around the signature. She sent the fax from the 
machine "near Mr. Cartright's office. Three days later, she stayed after hours and waited till 
everyone left. She walked into Johannson's office, and tried logging onto the network with 
his username and the password, marry63. It worked. In minutes she had located the product 
specification files for the Cobra 273, and downloaded them to a Zip disk.  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Table 52. Example the Samantha’s revenge security risk 
Business asset Information about COBRA 273, password,username, signature 
IS asset Samantha Gregson 
Security Criterion Integrity of information about COBRA 273, password, username, 
signature; confidentiality of information about COBRA 273, 
password, username, signature. 
Impact Negation of confidentiality of password. 
Vulnerability Samantha Gregson is not trusted. 
Threat agent Insider (Samantha Greyson): who has all necessary access inside of 
the company 
Attack method Attacker used shoulder surfing and memorized password. She 
found a copy in the files and typed up a new version, using language 
from the original one. She walked into Johannsson’s office, and 
tried logging onto the network with his username and the password, 
marry63. It worked. In minutes she had located the product 
specification files for the Cobra 273, and downloaded them to a Zip 
disk. 
Control Organization has to deploy all possible countermeasures of 
protection. 
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II. Social Engineering Examples in BPMN 
 Search in Recycle Bin 
Context and asset identification.  Illustration to the applied BPMN security extension to 
the case “Search in recycle bin” in presented in Figure 14.  As an employee wants to receive 
Test Numbered  Directory he sends a request (task Ask for Test Numbered Directory) to 
certain department (task Retrieves Test Numbered Directory). When the division of the 
company receives request, it provides the copy of Test Numbered Directory to the 
switchman. 
 
Figure 14. Seach in recycle bin - BPMN assets identification 
If consider the incident from Risk-related concept attacker called to the small central office 
telephone company building and said that for security reasons he cannot give employees 
copy until he gets old one. Next situation was where the potential attacker (pool Attacker in 
Figure 15) wished to get information from the switchman.  An Attacker called (task Asks 
for Test Numbered Directory)  to employee (task Maintain for Test Numbered Directory) 
then asked to leave its copy in order to get a new version. As employee trusted to the caller 
and sent back a copy (tasks Uses Test Number Directory). Then attacker received it (task 
Test Numbered Directory received).  
In the final analysis from risk treatment-related concept presented how security flows can 
be mitigated. First of all switchman needed to verify from his colleagues that there has been 
issued a new version of Test Numbered Directory and to ask from security specialist is there 
mentioned something about exchange of published and printed out materials copies in 
security policy. To reduce the probability of providing internal information to the attacker, 
it has been introduced such task as ask for ID.  When attacker provided fake ID employee 
could maintain task check ID and if it is wrong, reject request (task Refuse to give data).  
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Figure 15. Search in recycle bin - BPMN risks identification 
 
Figure 16. Search in recycle bin – BPMN risk treatment 
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 Through Internet 
Context and asset identification. Next situation was where the university’s Registration 
office (pool Registration office in Figure 17) wished to get information about Michael Parker 
from university record’s database.  In order to get any information the Registration office 
checks it from the database (task Requests for data, Maintains Login and password, 
Provides Login and Password). Meanwhile the database performs following task Retrieves 
data, Asks for Login and password, Login and password received. If the Login and 
Password provided by Registration office is correct, database will extract necessary 
information and provide it to the Registration office (task provided data). 
 
Figure 17. Through Internet – BPMN assets identification 
In order to get required information, the Attacker/ Michael Parker did several necessary 
calls.  During all calls the basic scheme of attack was the same. First of all the caller asks to 
provide some information from Registrar’s office.  In order to get it the attacker Request for 
data. After a message received (task Maintain data) Registration office checks it from the 
database (task Ask data, Data received) and provides received data (task Uses data). 
Michael Parker receives information (task data received) and uses it (task Uses data). 
From Risk-related concept (see Figure 18) attacker went to the main library on the 
university campus, he sat down at a computer terminal, got up on the Internet, and accessed 
to the university's Web site. Then attacker called the Registrar's office. In order to get 
required information, the  
Attacker/ Michael Parker did several necessary calls. During the process of obtaining 
necessary data the basic scheme of attack was the same. First of all the caller asked to 
provide some information from Registrar’s office.  In order to get information the attacker 
Request for data. After a message received (task Maintain data) Registration office checks 
it from the database (task Ask for data, Data received) and provides received data (task Uses 
data). Michael Parker receives information task data received and uses it (task Uses data 
for unintended purpose). 
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Figure 18. Through Internet -  BPMN risks identification 
Henceforth Risk treatment concept for all employees who are able to access any sensitive 
information have to know the importance of that information. University has to aintain a list 
of people who have been specially trained in the procedures and who are trusted to authorize 
sending out sensitive information. It is required that only these people are allowed to send 
information to anyone outside the workgroup. In this case it might be better to ask an ID 
beforehand in order to start the internal process of getting any sensitive information.  Then 
Registration office has to ask an ID, check it (task Ask for ID, ID received, check ID) and 
only then provide data in case ID is correct.  
 
Figure 19. Through Internet – BPMN risk treatment 
Through Persuasion 
Context and asset identification. Next situation was where a user Steve (pool Steve in 
Figure 20) wished to get information from GeminiMed Medical Products. In order to get it, 
Steve requested that information from computer server. Firstly computer server asks to 
provide ID and password (task Asked ID and password) then Steve receives a request (task 
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Retrieved ID and password, Provided ID and password) and computer servicer receives ID 
(task ID received). If the provided data is correct, Steve receives data (task Data received) 
and can use it (task Uses data).  
 
Figure 20. Through persuasion – BPMN assets identification 
Risk related concept. Steve received a call from Ramon Perez from tech support with an 
information that three of the servers are not working and they’ll need some time to reinstall 
the driver and restore all of their files. To have an access to his information as soon as 
possible Steven asked from tech support to deal with it urgently. Ramon Perez was pleased 
to help, but in order to help he needed to ask some verification questions. In Figure 21 the 
Caller requested a data (task Calls and asks for data) that has Steve (task maintain data). In 
order to provide any information Steve was suspicious that caller asked his private 
information (task Asks to verify). To sound authentic Caller gave old password (task 
provided old ID and password). Steve received it (task ID Received) and provided requested 
information (task provided data). Finally as data received, caller used it to his own purpose 
(task Uses data for not intended purpose).  
 
Figure 21. Through persuasion – BPMN risks identification 
Risk treatment concept. Steve needed to verify that person who called is from technical 
support and taking into account that he got suspicious, not provide any information until a 
call to the boss or co-worker. To reduce the possibility of accepting the message Steve 
shouldn’t accept old ID and password.  
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Figure 22. Through persuasion – BPMN risk treatment 
Breaking Through Computer Network 
Context and asset identification. Next situation was where one department of an 
organization (pool IT Technical support in Figure 23) wished to get some information. In 
order to get, first of all, IT technical support (task Ask data) called to the project leader (task 
Retrieve data). A project leader checked the availability of the information from servers to 
provide data (task Provide data) to IT support (task Data received). As soon as technical 
support received information, it can be used by that department.  
 
Figure 23. Breaking through computer network – BPMN assets identification 
If consider the incident from Risk-related concept attacker noticed un-patched 
vulnerability in the Web-Server software. Called to IT technical support, claims to be a 
company employee, and asks phone number of project leader. Then called to project leader 
as a guy from IT and received name of servers. In both cases attacker performed called to 
the department (task Calls and asks for data) and received necessary information (task Data 
received). Using that data caller (task Uses for not intended purpose) was able to make a 
technical attacks on systems that provide remote access capability to identify weak 
password. When he was not able to find a password to ATM5, he figured out that some 
member might have chosen the same password for both machines and did further research 
in that area.  
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Figure 24. Breaking through computer network – BPMN risks identification 
Henceforth Risk treatment concept typically involves taking steps on both human and 
technical levels. Because both commercial and public-domain hacking tools can be obtained 
by anyone for whatever purpose they have in mind, it's all the more important that you be 
vigilant in protecting enterprise computer systems and your network infrastructure. To do it 
any employee shouldn’t speak valuable information of the organization and do no use easy 
passwords. In this case IT technical support should ask to verify caller’s identity and provide 
ID (task Asks to verify).  
 
Figure 25. Breaking through computer network – BPMN risk treatment 
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III. Social Engineering Examples in MUC 
Search in Recycle Bin 
Asset Model. The case is focused on Switchman and the Test Number Directory system. 
An asset is only Switchman who is a user of the Test Number Directory. In order to get any 
information Switchman Asks for Test Number Directory and Uses Test Number Directory. 
The Ask for Test Number Directory includes Retrieve Test Number Directory. Test Number 
Directory provided has a security criterion Confidentiality of information in Test Number 
Directory represented as a hexagon. According to the ISSRM domain model Ask for Test 
Number Directory has been identified as a business asset that has a value to the organization. 
Retrieve Test Number Directory supports the business asset and is considered as an IS asset. 
The Asks for Test Number Directory and Uses Test Number Directory are business asset. 
Retrieve Test Number Directory are IS asset.  
 
Figure 26. Search in recycle bin – misuase case assets model 
Risk Model. In Figure 27 is presented security threat scenario. A misuser (i.e., Attacker) 
uses vulnerability (i.e., User is not experienced, Switchman is not reliable) to initiate misuse 
case (i.e., Calls and asks for Test Number Directory). In the picture Call for Test Number 
Directory exploits the fact that User is not experienced. Threat Calls and asks for Test 
Number Directory threatens Ask for Test Number Directory.  
Risk treatment model. SROMUC does not support the risk treatment concept, but it is 
possible to model a security use case for identification of security requirement. In the Figure 
28 represented security use case. It is shown by a use case diagram with a lock inside to 
mark security requirement for identified threats. The use case Switchman and Uses Test 
Number Directory (i.e., IS Asset) has to include a security use case (i.e., Check ID). The 
security use case mitigates the misuse case (i.e., User is not experienced). It ensures security 
criterion (i.e., Confidentiality of Information in Test Number Directory) imposed by 
business use case (i.e., Provided Test Number Directory).  
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Figure 27. Search in recycle bin – misuse case risk model 
 
Figure 28. Search in recycle bin – misuse case risk treatment 
Through Internet 
Asset Model.  An asset is only Registration office who has an access to the system. In order 
to get any information Registration office Requests for data, Maintains Login and Password, 
Provides login and password and Data received. The Request for data includes Asks for 
Login and Password and extends Maintain Login and Password. Retrieve data has a security 
criterion Confidentiality of data represented as a hexagon. The Provide data includes two 
use cases Login and Password Check and Data received. According to the ISSRM domain 
model Request for data has been identified as a business asset that has a value to the 
organization. Retrieve data supports the business asset and is considered as an IS asset. The 
Maintains Login and password, Ask for Login and Password are business asset.  
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Figure 29. Through Internet – misuse case assets model 
Risk Model. In Figure 30 is presented security threat scenario. A misuser (i.e., Attacker) 
uses vulnerability (i.e., Registration office is not trusted, Registration office is not 
experienced to verify the caller) to initiate misuse case (i.e., Calls for data). Request for data 
exploits the fact that User is not experienced. Threat User is not experienced threatens 
Request for data which includes retrieve data and disaffirms Confidentiality of data. 
 
Figure 30. Through Internet -  misuse case risk model 
Risk treatment model. SROMUC does not support the risk treatment concept, but it is 
possible to model a security use case for identification of security requirement. In the Figure 
31 represented security use case. It is shown by a use case diagram with a lock inside to 
mark security requirement for identified threats. The use case Registration office and 
Maintain data (i.e., IS Asset) has to include a security use case (i.e., Check ID). The security 
use case mitigates the misuse case (i.e., Registration office is not experienced to verify the 
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caller). It ensures security criterion (i.e., Confidentiality of data) imposed by business use 
case (i.e., Maintain data).  
 
Figure 31. Through Internet – misuse case risk treatment 
Through Persuasion 
Asset Model. The case is focused on Steve and the computer server. In order to get any 
information Steve Calls and asks for data, retrieved ID and password, Uses data. The 
Maintains ID and password includes Provided ID and password. Asked ID and password 
has a security criterion Confidentiality of data represented as a hexagon. According to the 
ISSRM domain model Calls and asks for data has been identified as a business asset that 
has a value to the organization. Retrieved ID and password supports the business asset and 
is considered as an IS asset.  
 
Figure 32. Through persuasion – misuse case assets model 
Risk Model. In Figure 33 is presented security threat scenario. A misuser (i.e., Caller) uses 
vulnerability (i.e., No experience to verify the caller, Steve is not trusted) to initiate misuse 
case (i.e., Calls for data). Call for data exploits the fact that Steve is not experienced. Threat 
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Calls for data threatens Ask for data which extends Retrieve data and disaffirms 
Confidentiality of data.  
 
Figure 33. Through persuasion – misuse case risk model 
Risk treatment model. SROMUC does not support the risk treatment concept, but it is 
possible to model a security use case for identification of security requirement. In the Figure 
34 represented security use case. It is shown by a use case diagram with a lock inside to 
mark security requirement for identified threats. The use case Steve and Calls and asks for 
data   (i.e., IS Asset) has to include a security use case (i.e., Check ID). The security use case 
mitigates the misuse case (i.e., No experience to verify the caller). It ensures security 
criterion (i.e., Confidentiality of information) imposed by business use case (i.e., provided 
data).  
 
Figure 34. Through persuasion – misuse case risk treatment 
Breaking Through Computer Network 
Asset Model. An asset is IT Technical support and Project Leader who has an access to the 
system. In order to get any information IT Technical support Maintain data, Asks data and 
Uses data. The Ask for data includes Maintain data and extends Retrieve data. Retrieve data 
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has a security criterion Confidentiality of data represented as a hexagon. The Provide data 
includes two use cases Retrieve data and Uses data. According to the ISSRM domain model 
Ask for data has been identified as a business asset that has a value to the organization. 
Retrieve data supports the business asset and is considered as an IS asset. The Maintain data, 
Ask for data and Uses data are business asset. Retrieve data and Provide data are IS asset.  
 
Figure 35. Breaking through computer network – misuse case assets model 
Risk Model. In Figure 36 is presented security threat scenario. A misuser (i.e., Attacker/ 
Ivan Peters) uses vulnerability (i.e., IT technical support is not trusted, No experience to 
verify the caller) to initiate misuse case (i.e., Calls for data). Call and asks for data exploits 
the fact that No experience to verify the caller. Threat Calls for data threatens Ask for data 
which extends Retrieve data and disaffirms Confidentiality of data.  
 
Figure 36. Breaking through computer network – misuse case risk model 
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Risk treatment model. SROMUC does not support the risk treatment concept, but it is 
possible to model a security use case for identification of security requirement. In the Figure 
37 represented security use case. It is shown by a use case diagram with a lock inside to 
mark security requirement for identified threats. The use case IT technical support and 
Maintain data (i.e., IS Asset) has to include a security use case (i.e., Check ID). The security 
use case mitigates the misuse case (i.e., IT technical support is not trusted). It ensures 
security criterion (i.e., Confidentiality of data) imposed by business use case (i.e., Maintain 
data).  
 
Figure 37. Breaking through computer network – misuse case risk treatment 
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IV. Social Engineering Examples in Secure Tropos 
Search in recycle bin 
Asset identification. Illustration to the applied Secure Tropos security extension to the case 
“Search in recycle bin” is presented in Figure 38.  Here is represented only goals (e.g., Query 
received) and plans (e.g., provide data).  In Secure Tropos security objectives are identified 
by softgoals (e.g., Confidentiality) and by security criteria which is communicated with se-
curity constraints (e.g., Confidentiality of data).  
 
Figure 38. Search in recycle bin – Secure Tropos asset identification 
Risk analysis. Next Figure 39 is focused on a possible event of the risk exposure. It de-
scribes a situation where a threat agent (e.g., malicious caller) wished to get an information 
from the switchman (e.g., Switchman). An attacker damages the Test Numbered Directory 
in the data provided. The Social engineering attack impacts Privacy. Malicious caller has a 
threat (Use data for not intended purpose) to support of data provided. Attacker attacks data 
provided through exploiting the vulnerability identified in uses data. The exploits link shows 
a relationship between an attack method (Call and ask for data) and a vulnerable IS asset 
(Uses data). 
Security requirements definition.  In order to mitigate risks, we have designed goals and 
plans. In current example plan is Check ID. It is shows in a dotted background pattern. 
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Figure 39. Search in recycle bin – Secure Tropos risk identification 
 
Figure 40. Search in recycle bin – Secure Tropos risk treatment 
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Through Internet 
Asset identification. Illustration to the applied Secure Tropos security extension to the case 
“Through Internet” is presented in Figure 41.  Here is represented only goals (e.g., Query 
received) and plans (e.g., provide data).  In Secure Tropos security objectives are identified 
by softgoals (e.g., Confidentiality) and by security criteria which is communicated with se-
curity constraints (e.g., Confidentiality of data).  
 
Figure 41. Through Internet – Secure Tropos asset identificaiton 
Risk analysis. Next Figure 42 is focused on a possible event of the risk exposure. It de-
scribes a situation where a threat agent (e.g., malicious caller) wished to get an information 
from the Registration office (e.g., Registration office). An attacker damages Data in the data 
provided. The Social engineering attack impacts Privacy. Malicious caller has a threat (Use 
data for not intended purpose) to support of data provided. Attacker attacks data provided 
through exploiting the vulnerability identified in uses data. The exploits link shows a rela-
tionship between an attack method (Call and ask for data) and a vulnerable IS asset (Uses 
data). 
Security requirements definition.  In order to mitigate risks, we have designed goals and 
plans. In current example plan is Check ID. It is shows in a dotted background pattern. 
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Figure 42. Through Internet – Secure Tropos risk identification 
 
Figure 43. Through Internet – Secure Tropos risk treatment 
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Through Persuasion 
Asset identification. Illustration to the applied Secure Tropos security extension to the case 
“Through persuasion” is presented in Figure 44.  Here is represented only goals (e.g., Query 
received) and plans (e.g., provide data).  In Secure Tropos security objectives are identified 
by softgoals (e.g., Confidentiality) and by security criteria which is communicated with se-
curity constraints (e.g., Confidentiality of data).  
 
Figure 44. Through persuasion – Secure Tropos asset identification 
Risk analysis. Next Figure 45 is focused on a possible event of the risk exposure. It de-
scribes a situation where a threat agent (e.g., malicious caller) wished to get an information 
from the Steve (e.g., Steve). An attacker damages Data in the data provided. The Social 
engineering attack impacts Privacy. Malicious caller has a threat (Use data for not intended 
purpose) to support of data provided. Attacker attacks data provided through exploiting the 
vulnerability identified in uses data. The exploits link shows a relationship between an attack 
method (Call and ask for data) and a vulnerable IS asset (Uses data). 
Security requirements definition.  In order to mitigate risks, we have designed goals and 
plans. In current example plan is Check ID. It is shows in a dotted background pattern. 
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Figure 45. Through persuasion – Secure Tropos risk identification 
 
Figure 46. Through persuasion – Secure Tropos risk treatment 
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Breaking Through Computer Network 
Asset identification. Illustration to the applied Secure Tropos security extension to the case 
“Breaking through computer network” is presented in Figure 47. Here is represented only 
goals (e.g., Query received) and plans (e.g., provide data).  In Secure Tropos security ob-
jectives are identified by softgoals (e.g., Confidentiality) and by security criteria which is 
communicated with security constraints (e.g., Confidentiality of data).  
 
Figure 47. Breaking through computer network – Seucre Tropos asset identification 
Risk analysis. Next Figure 48 is focused on a possible event of the risk exposure. It de-
scribes a situation where a threat agent (e.g., Ivan Peter) wished to get an information from 
the IT technical support (e.g., IT technical support). An attacker damages Data in the data 
provided. The Social engineering attack impacts Privacy. Malicious caller has a threat (Use 
data for not intended purpose) to support of data provided. Attacker attacks data provided 
through exploiting the vulnerability identified in uses data. The exploits link shows a rela-
tionship between an attack method (Call and ask for data) and a vulnerable IS asset (Uses 
data). 
Security requirements definition.  In order to mitigate risks, we have designed goals and 
plans. In current example plan is Check ID. It is shows in a dotted background pattern. 
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Figure 48. Breaking through computer network – Secure Tropos risk identification 
 
Figure 49. Breaking through computer network – Secure Tropos risk treatment  
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V. Questionnaire of BPMN 
 
 
 What is …? Which language construct 
expresses …? 
Business Asset   
IS Asset   
Security criterion   
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 What is …? Which language construct 
expresses …? 
Risk   
Impact   
Event   
Vulnerability   
Threat   
Threat agent   
Attack method   
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 What is …? Which language construct 
expresses …? 
Risk treatment decision   
Security requirement   
Control   
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VI. Questionnaire of Misuse Case 
 
 
 What is …? Which language construct 
expresses …? 
Business Asset   
IS Asset   
Security criterion   
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 What is …? Which language construct 
expresses …? 
Risk   
Impact   
Event   
Vulnerability   
Threat   
Threat agent   
Attack method   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
120 
 
 
 What is …? Which language construct 
expresses …? 
Risk treatment decision   
Security requirement   
Control   
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VII. Questionnaire of Secure Tropos 
 
 What is …? Which language construct 
expresses …? 
Business Asset   
IS Asset   
Security criterion   
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 What is …? Which language construct 
expresses …? 
Risk   
Impact   
Event   
Vulnerability   
Threat   
Threat agent   
Attack method   
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 What is …? Which language construct 
expresses …? 
Risk treatment decision   
Security requirement   
Control   
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VIII. Data upon BPMN Concepts and Constructs 
 
BPMN con-
cept results/ 
‘What is 
…?” 
Concept 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 Results 
Business As-
set 
Data - - + + + - + + + - + + 4/12 
 Caller and its 
business process 
including Call 
and ask for data 
and Data received 
- + - + - - - - - - - + 9/12 
 Jenny tasks Main-
tain data and Uses 
data could be con-
sidered as busi-
ness asset under 
some circum-
stance 
+ + - + + + + - - + - - 5/12 
IS Asset Jenny - - - - - - - - - - - - 12/12 
 Jenny’s process 
write query for 
data, data re-
ceived 
- - + - - - - - - - - - 11/12 
 Process executed 
in CBIS 
+ + + + - - - - - - + - 7/12 
 Database + + + + + + + + + + + + 0 
Security cri-
terion 
Confidentiality + + + + + + + + + + + + 0 
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BPMN con-
cept results/ 
‘What is …?” 
Concept 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 Results 
Risk Malicious caller  + + + - - + + - + + + + 3/12 
 Malicious caller 
calls and asks 
for data, 
receives data, 
and uses data 
for not intended 
purpose  
+ + + - - - - - - + + + 6/12 
 Jenny has no 
experience to 
verify the caller 
- - + - + + + - + - + + 5/12 
 Data 
confidentiality 
negation and 
data reception 
for unintended 
use. 
+ + + - + - - - - + + + 5/12 
Impact Data 
confidentiality 
negated 
+ + + - - - + - + - + + 5/12 
 Data received + - - - - - - - - - - - 11/12 
 Harm to Jenny 
is not indicated 
- - - - - - - - - - - - 12/12 
Event Malicious caller 
calls and asks 
for data, 
receives data, 
and uses data 
for not intended 
purpose  
+ + + + + + + - - + + - 3/12 
 Jenny has no 
experience to 
verify the caller  
+ + + - + + + - + + + - 3/12 
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Vulnerability Jenny has no 
experience to 
verify the caller 
+ + + - + + + - + + + + 2/12 
Threat Malicious caller 
calls and asks 
for data, 
receives data, 
and uses data 
for not intended 
purpose 
- + + + + + + - - + - - 5/12 
Threat agent Malicious caller + + + + + + + - + + + + 1/12 
Attack 
method 
Call and ask for 
data 
- - + - - - + - - + + - 8/12 
 Data received - + - - - - - - - - - - 11/12 
 Use for not 
intended 
purpose 
- - - - - - - - - - - - 12/12 
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BPMN con-
cept results/ 
‘What is …?” 
Concept 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 Results 
Risk treat-
ment decision 
Data reduction - - + + - - - - - - - - 10/12 
Security re-
quirement 
Ask for ID + - + + + + - - + + + + 3/12 
 After ID is re-
ceived check if 
ID is ok 
+ - + + + + - - + - + + 4/12 
 If not refuse to 
give data 
+ - + + + + + - + - + + 3/12 
Control Not proposed - - - - - - - - - - - - 12/12 
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BPMN con-
struct results 
Concept 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 Results 
Business As-
set 
Data store - - - - + - - + + - + - 8/10 
 Combination of  
Flow objects 
(tasks, sequence 
flow and events) 
+ + - + - - - - - - + - 8/10 
IS Asset Pool - + - + + + + + - - - - 6/10 
 Combination of  
Flow objects 
(tasks, sequence 
flow and events) 
- - - + - - - - - - - - 11/10 
Security cri-
terion 
Annotation - + - - - + + + + - + - 7/10 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
129 
 
BPMN con-
structs re-
sults 
Concept 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 Results 
Risk Combination of 
event and impact 
- - - - - + + + + - + + 6/10 
Impact Unlock - - - - + + + + + - + + 5/10 
 Event - - - - - - - - - - - - 12/10 
Event Combination of 
constructs for 
Threat and 
Vulnerability 
+ - - - + + + + + - + + 4/10 
Vulnerabil-
ity 
Annotation + + - - + + + + + - + + 3/10 
Threat Combination of 
constructs for 
Threat agent and  
Attack method 
+ - - + + + + + + - + + 3/10 
Threat 
agent 
Pool + + - + + + + + + - + + 2/10 
Attack 
method 
Combination of 
flow objects 
(tasks and event) 
using sequence 
flow 
+ + - + + + + + - - + + 3/10 
Risk treat-
ment deci-
sion 
No constructs - + - + - + + + + - + + 4/10 
Security re-
quirement 
Combination of  
Flow objects 
(tasks, gateways 
and events) using 
Sequence Flow 
+ + - + + + + + + - + - 3/10 
Control No constructs - + - - + + + + - - + - 6/10 
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IX. Data upon Misuse Case Concepts and Constructs 
 
MUC con-
cepts results 
Concept 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Results 
Business As-
set 
Data + - - + - - - + + + 5/10 
 Call and ask for 
data, receive data 
+ + + - + + - + - - 4/10 
 Under some 
circumstance: use 
cases like 
Maintain data, 
Write query for 
data, Uses data 
+ + + - - + + - - - 5/10 
IS Asset Combination of 
use cases, like 
Maintain data, 
Write query for 
data, Use data, 
Retrieve data,  
Provide data 
- + - - - + + - - - 7/10 
 Home Town 
Electric Power 
- - + - - - - - - - 9/10 
Security cri-
terion 
Confidentiality of 
data 
- + + + + + + + + + 1/10 
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MUC con-
cepts results 
Concept 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Results 
Risk Malicious 
caller  
+ - + - + - - - - - 7/10 
 Malicious 
caller calls and 
asks for data, 
receives data, 
and uses data 
for not 
intended 
purpose  
- - - - - - - - - - 10/10 
 Jenny has no 
experience to 
verify  
the caller 
+ + - + + - - - - + 5/10 
 Data 
confidentiality 
negation and 
data reception 
for unintended 
use. 
+ + + - + - + + - - 4/10 
Impact Negate  
confidentiality 
of data  
+ +
- 
+ + + + + + + - 1/10 
 Jenny is not 
trusted (harm 
to IS asset) 
+ + + - - - + - + - 5/10 
 Harm to 
maintain data 
(harm to 
business asset) 
- - - - - - + - - - 9/10 
Event Malicious 
caller calls and 
asks for data, 
receives data, 
and uses data 
for not 
intended 
purpose  
+ - - - + +   + - 4/10 
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 Jenny has no 
experience to 
verify the 
caller  
+ + - + + - - - + + 2/10 
Vulnerability No experience 
to  
verify the 
caller when 
maintaining 
the data 
+ + + -- + + + - + + 2/10 
Threat Caller calls and 
asks for data, 
receives data, 
and uses data 
for unintended 
purpose 
+ + - - - + - - - - 7/10 
Threat agent Malicious 
caller 
+ + + + + + + + + + 0 
Attack 
method 
Call and ask for 
data 
+ + + - - + - - - - 5/10 
 Data received + + - - - - - - - - 8/10 
 Use for not 
intended 
purpose 
+ - - - - - - - - - 9/10 
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MUC concepts 
results 
Concept 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Results 
Risk treatment 
decision 
Data reduc-
tion 
- - - - - - - - - - 1010 
Security re-
quirement 
Ask for ID, + - - + - - + +  - 6/10 
 check if ID is 
OK if not 
refuse to give 
data 
- - - + - - + + - - 7/10 
Control Not modelled - - - - - - - - - - 10/10 
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MUC constructs 
results 
Concepts 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Re-
sults 
Business Asset Uses cases and ap-
propriate link to ex-
press include 
- - - - - + + + - - 7/10 
IS Asset Use cases - - - - - + + - + - 7/10 
 System boundary - - - - - - - - + - 9/10 
Security Criterion Construct for secu-
rity criterion “hez-
agon” and link ex-
press constraint of 
- - - - + + + + + - 5/10 
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MUC constructs 
results 
Concepts 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Results 
Risk Combination of 
event and impact 
- - - - - - - + - - 9/10 
Impact Impact construct 
and appropriate 
links to express 
harm and negation 
of security criterion 
- + - - - - + - + + 6/10 
Event Combination of 
constructs used to 
express threat and 
vulnerability 
- - - - - + + + + - 6/10 
Vulnerability Vulnerability use 
case 
+ - - - - + + - + + 5/10 
Threat Combination of 
misuser and misuse 
cases are linked by 
include 
- + - - + + + - + - 5/10 
Threat agent Misuser - + - - + + + - + - 5/10 
Attack method Misuse case con-
struct and link in-
clude cases 
- - - - - + - - - - 9/10 
Risk treatment de-
cision 
No construct - - - - - - - + - - 9/10 
Security require-
ment 
Security use case 
construct and ink 
include 
+ + - - - - + - - - 7/10 
Control No construct - - - - - - - + - - 9/10 
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X. Data upon Secure Tropos Concepts and Constructs 
 
Secure 
Tropos 
concepts 
results 
Concepts 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 Results 
Business 
asset 
Data - + + - - + + + + - + - 5/12 
 Under some 
circumstances 
as business 
asset could be 
considered: 
write query for 
data and data 
provided 
- + + + + + - + - - - + 5/12 
 Call and ask 
for data 
+ + + + + + - + + - + + 2/12 
 Caller and 
Jenny 
- + - + + + - + - - + - 6/12 
IS asset Jenny + - + - - - + - - + - + 7/12 
 Jenny’s 
process: write 
query for data, 
uses data, data 
provided 
- - - - - - - - - - - - 12/12 
 Process 
executed in 
CBIS as query 
received, 
provided data, 
data from 
CBIS received 
+ + + + + + + + + - + + 1/12 
Security 
criterion 
Confidentiality 
of data 
+ + + + - + + + + + + + 1/12 
 Confidentiality + - - + + - - + - + - - 7/12 
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Secure Tropos 
concepts 
results 
Concepts 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 Results 
Risk Malicious caller 
calls and asks 
for data, re-
ceives data and 
uses data for not 
intended pur-
pose 
- - - + - + + + + + + + 4/12 
 to exploit use of 
data 
- + - - - + + - - - - - 9/12 
 attack data  - - - - - + + - - - + - 9/12 
 social engineer-
ing attack has 
been used to ne-
gate confidenti-
ality of data 
+ - + - + + + + - + - + 4/12 
Impact Social engineer-
ing attack im-
pacts confiden-
tiality of data 
+ - + + + + - + + + + + 2/12 
Event Malicious caller 
calls and asks 
for data, re-
ceives data and 
uses data for not 
intended pur-
pose 
+ + + + - + + + - - + + 3/12 
 to exploit use of 
data 
- - + - - + + + - - - - 8/12 
 attack data  - + - - - + + + - - - - 8/12 
 social engineer-
ing attack has 
been used to ne-
gate confidenti-
ality of data 
- + + + + + + + + + + - 2/12 
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Vulnerability Not clearly 
identified but 
points out that 
vulnerable is 
use of data 
+ + + - - - - - - - - + 8/12 
Threat Malicious caller 
calls and asks 
for data, re-
ceives data and 
uses data for not 
intended pur-
pose 
- - + + + - - - - + + + 6/12 
Threat agent Malicious caller + + + + + + + + + + + + 0 
Attack method calls and asks 
for data, re-
ceives data and 
uses data for not 
intended pur-
pose 
+ - + + + - - - - - - + 7/12 
Risk treatment 
decision 
risk reduction - + + - + + - + - + - + 5/12 
Security re-
quirement 
check ID - + - + + + + - + + - - 5/12 
Control not proposed - - - + - - - - - - - - 11/12 
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Secure Tropos 
constructs re-
sults 
Concepts 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 Results 
Business Asset Actor supports 
hardgoal de-
pendency and 
plan depend-
ency 
+ + + + + + + + + + + + 0 
IS Asset Actor + + - + + + + + + + - + 2/12 
 composition of 
the plan, 
hardgoal using 
decomposition, 
mean-ends rela-
tionships 
- + + + + + - + + + + - 3/12 
Security crite-
rion 
Security con-
straint contribu-
tion 
+ + + + - + + + + + + + 1/12 
 Softgoal + + + - + - - + - + + + 4/12 
Risk Combination of 
event and im-
pact 
+ - + - - - + - - + - + 7/12 
Impact Impacts + - + - - - + - - - + + 7/12 
Event Combination of 
an agent, goal, 
plan, exploits 
and vulnerabil-
ity point 
+ - - - - - - - - - - + 10/12 
 Threat - + + - + + + + + + + - 3/12 
Vulnerability Vulnerability is 
not modelled, 
but vulnerabil-
ity points can be 
identified by the 
attributes of the 
assets 
- - - - - - + - - - - - 11/12 
Threat Combination of 
construct for 
- + + + + + - + + + + + 2/12 
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Threat agent 
and Attack 
method 
Threat agent Agent + + + + + + + + + + + + 0 
Attack method Agent executes 
plan and goal 
using mean-
ends, decompo-
sition relation-
ships 
+ + + + + + + + + + + + 0 
Risk treatment 
decision 
No constructs + − - - - + - - − - - - 10/12 
Security re-
quirement 
Plan that has 
dotted back-
ground pattern 
- + - + + + + + + + + - 3/12 
Control No constructs - - - - - - - - - + - - 11/12 
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